How Middle East governments responding to rapprochement with Assad
QAMISHLI, Syria (North Press) – This week, Turkey is scheduled to hold the highest-level meeting with Syrian government officials since 2011. Last week, Saudi Arabia extended an invitation to the Syrian government to re-take its seat at the Arab League over a decade since it was expelled. Ankara and Riyadh once bankrolled Syrian factions dead-set on Assad’s fall; both are now ready to resume ties with the same “dictator”. What effects has this volte-face had on the Middle East?
[PART II]
Neighborly relations
Jordan
For Syria’s neighbors, rapprochement with al-Assad is more than a simple geopolitical strategy; it can take on existential importance. Case in point: Jordan. Jordan’s Minister of Foreign has warned that his country is “in the line of fire” of any action taken on Syria. In recent years, the country spearheaded normalization with Damascus together with the UAE. But that was not always the case.
For much of their existence, the two countries fell on opposite sides of the Cold War divide. When protests broke out in 2011, Jordan’s government sided with the opposition and demanded al-Assad “step down.” In subsequent years, it funded and trained armed groups fighting al-Assad, provided shelter to around 1.4 million Syrians, and joined the US-led intervention in Syria. Yet it also never completely cut off relations with Damascus.
Jordan’s policy towards Syria experienced an abrupt shift starting in 2014, informed sources say, as ISIS gained strength in Syria and began threatening Jordan. Its monarch also feared the rise of an unstable Islamist force in its northern neighbor. Al-Assad began to seem like the ‘least bad’ option. In 2018, Jordan supported a Russian-led operation to re-take Syrian territory across the border from Jordan.
Despite having been historically divided, trade between Jordan and Syria has always been important. Amman is just 70km from the Syrian border and around 170km from Damascus. Goods to and from Turkey also flowed through Syria. The Syrian war put a halt to that. Jordan re-opened the Daraa crossing to Syria in August 2018, when government forces captured it, leading to a growth in local trade.
Since 2021, Jordan’s King Abdullah II has led diplomatic efforts to normalize relations between al-Assad and other Middle Eastern states. Abdullah has circulated a ‘Syria non-paper’ among the region’s leaders and presented it to US President Joe Biden during a visit to Washington in July 2021 and Russia’s Vladimir Putin in August 2021. It called on Arab governments to involve themselves in diplomatic talks with Damascus and reach common solutions. “The Arab states are the first to lead the dialogue process to resolve the Syrian crisis and its consequences that affects the Arab region more than others,” Jordan’s foreign minister said in 2023.
Jordan’s main concerns in talks with Syria has been to stem the illegal trade in captagon from Syria, through Jordan, to the Gulf; ensuring a return of Syrian refugees in Jordan; and addressing security concerns, such as the presence of Iranian-backed forces on their common border.
In October 2021, the ministers of electricity of Syria, Lebanon and Jordan revived a 2001 agreement to supply Lebanon with power through Syria. A call between Abdullah II and al-Assad followed. In 2022, a similar gas deal for Lebanon (including Egypt and later Qatar) was also agreed upon and given the green light by the US.
Jordan took a further step towards Damascus after a deadly earthquake in February 2023, sending several tons of aid, and arranging a visit by Jordan’s Minister of Foreign Affairs to Damascus that same month. A memorandum signed by the agriculture ministers of Syria, Jordan, Iraq and Lebanon followed in March, ensuring cooperation around food security. The Jordanian cabinet minister said the deal “reveals the true brotherly feelings among the four countries.” After years of attempting to bring the Middle East together, Jordan’s efforts seem to be bearing fruit in 2023.
Egypt
Despite Egypt being within Washington’s sphere of influence since the 1970s, Cairo and Damascus have generally had favorable relations since they formed a union in 1958. The government of Hosni Mubarak suspended high-level diplomatic ties in 2011, though cooperation continued at a lower level. The relationship reached its nadir in 2012, when post-revolutionary Egypt elected its first leader, the Muslim Brotherhood member Mohamed Morsi.
After only a year, however, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, the leader of the armed forces under Mubarak, took power in a coup. The relation between both states markedly improved, as both governments shared the fear of an Islamist opposition, though Egypt was less enthusiastic than Jordan or the UAE in rapprochement with al-Assad, as el-Sisi wanted to escape the pariah status afforded to Syria’s president. Nevertheless, in 2017, Cairo was the site for intra-Syrian talks.
In March 2019, Egypt’s Minister of Foreign Affairs stated that his country had “no conditions for Syria’s return” to the Arab League. In July of that year, however, sources within the government stated that Cairo opposed a re-admission. Two years later, in March of 2021, Egypt again called for Syria to return to the Arab League. In 2022, Egypt engaged with Syria (as well as Jordan and Lebanon) in a deal to send natural gas to Beirut.
A final push towards full normalization came in the wake of February’s earthquake. El-Sisi phoned al-Assad and dispatched his foreign minister to see the Syrian president in Damascus, the highest-level diplomatic meeting between the two countries since 2011. Cairo also used the earthquake to re-engage with Turkey. Since the toppling of Morsi, the relationship between the two had been frosty. However, Egypt’s rapprochement with Syria went further.
Damascus returned the favor this week, when Faisal Mekdad, Syrian Minister of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates, visited Cairo and met with his counterpart. The two sides agreed to “enhance communication” and put in place the necessary steps for Syria’s re-admission into the Arab League, Reuters reported. Local media also said that Bashar al-Assad would travel to Egypt soon, though an Egyptian lawmaker stated that such a meeting is unlikely in “the immediate future.”
The same FM also said that there was “no agreement to have Egyptian companies participate in rebuilding Syria, either.” Unlike Jordan and other direct neighbors of Syria, Egypt’s normalization with the Syrian government is not based on any direct security concerns, and instead more closely resembles the Gulf’s rapprochement.
Normalization, thus, is thought to be the first step towards investment in the reconstruction of Syria. The Wall Street Journal reports that Egyptian companies are hoping to win billion-dollar contracts; Egypt has become somewhat of a specialist in mammoth construction projects in recent years. Yet US-imposed sanctions are a major obstacle to such plans. Cairo is likely to follow Saudi Arabia’s lead in regards to normalization and reconstruction, as its battered economy is highly dependent on Saudi investment.
Iraq
Iraq and Syria are as much alike as they are different. Historically, Baghdad and Damascus have been at each other’s throats throughout most of the past half century. Only in recent decades has their relationship thawed, as both were lumped together within Washington’s ‘Axis of Evil’ in a fit of post-9/11 hysteria, Iranian influence in Iraq grew as a result of Saddam Hussein’s demise, and both faced the existential threat of ISIS. Unsurprisingly, Iraq has advocated against Syria’s expulsion from the Arab League from the beginning.
Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki abstained during the fateful vote in 2011 and voiced no support for the Syrian uprising, as his government was also being besieged by Sunni protestors. Iraq also never closed its embassy in Damascus. Baghdad has long said it opposed Syria’s isolation, announcing officially in 2021 that it would push for Syria’s re-admission into the Arab League.
Both countries have cooperated over the past decade. Besides the fight against ISIS, Syria and Iraq also opened a joint business council in 2022, and presented a united front in water disputes with Turkey. Iraqi Shi’as have also joined Iranian-backed militias in Syria in defense of the government. Moreover, both governments have voiced their opposition to “foreign forces” in the two countries – namely, American, but especially Turkish forces.
Damascus’ relationship with Iraq’s Kurdish autonomous region is more fraught. The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), the ruling party in Erbil, the capital, has long bankrolled a Kurdish political opposition coalition in Syria, known locally as the Kurdish National Council in Syria (ENKS). Unlike the Democratic Union Party (PYD), the largest party in Syria’s Kurdish regions, the ENKS was quick to join the Syrian opposition in 2011 and remains nominally under their umbrella. The KDP also runs the only official crossing between Iraq and the areas of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES), which Damascus says is illegal. Nevertheless, some Syrian politicians have visited Erbil in the past. In 2017, Syria’s Minister of Tourism visited the Kurdistan Region to strengthen tourism ties.
Lebanon
Lebanon’s official position towards al-Assad is difficult to pin down – not only because of the country’s dysfunction, but also because the opinions of its politicians are as numerous as the different sects they represent. Before the Arab Spring, in 2005, the country was divided in two camps: one in support of al-Assad and the Syrian occupation of Lebanon at the time, and another in opposition to said occupation. The respective March 8 and March 14 alliances (roughly) split Shi’a Lebanese parties into the former and Sunni Lebanese parties into the latter, with Christian parties divided among the two camps.
Lebanon has generally been wary of its larger neighbor, which has been behind countless political assassinations and has long aimed to absorb the heterogeneous coastal state. However, Syria and the Hezbollah party, which acted under its auspices, have presented a successful bulwark against Israeli aggression, too.
In 2011, Lebanon was one of the only countries (together with Yemen and Syria itself) to vote against Syria’s exit from the Arab League. The Lebanese government reiterated its support for al-Assad’s return in 2021, when its foreign affairs minister made comments to that effect. Lebanon has partaken in a number of bilateral efforts, such as the aforementioned agricultural memorandum. After the 2023 earthquake, Lebanon opened its airspace and seaports to aid shipments for Syria.
Resistance against al-Assad’s rule have also come from some Lebanese institutions, however. In 2022, the highest body of the Druze, a religious community which around 4.5 percent of all Lebanese adhere to and which sets the General Chief of Staff under the country’s power-sharing agreement, voiced their solidarity with anti-government protests in Suwayda, a historically Druze region in southern Syria.
Nonetheless, the most visible cooperation between both countries has been Hezbollah’s support against Syrian opposition factions and ISIS. Whereas Hezbollah was once directed by Syria when the latter ruled Lebanon, Hezbollah and other Iranian-backed militias seem to have taken a hold in Syria – most notably in Deir ez-Zor, as well as Damascus and the country’s south.
Today, most of the Lebanese political class run their campaigns on anti-refugee sentiment amidst a worsening currency crisis. Political parties in Lebanon, which hosts around 1.5 million Syrians (by far the highest rate per capita), have thus welcomed the stability brought about by al-Assad’s resurgence, and are calling for Syrians to return. In March 2023, the country’s minister for social affairs, called for a “serious solution,” suggesting Syrians in Lebanon should either return or be resettled to a third country.
Palestine
The Syrian-Palestinian relationship is complex. Palestinian flags are draped over every Syrian public building in a performative act that is much more about legitimizing the al-Assad government than it symbolizes genuine support for the stateless people. Yet, before the war, Syria was home to around half a million Palestinians; the al-Assad family also has historically provided Palestinian liberation organizations with arms and financing. Nonetheless, many Palestinians in Syria turned against the government in 2011.
Hamas, the Islamist party-cum-militia which runs the Gaza Strip, was headquartered in Syria until 2012, when it left the country citing its support for the uprising. Hamas’ roots go back to the Muslim Brotherhood, a long-time enemy of the al-Assads. However, Hamas, like al-Assad, is bankrolled by Tehran. Hamas’ ‘Chief of Arab Relations’, Khalil al-Haya, visited Damascus for a “historic meeting” with al-Assad in October 2022, after which it said they had reached “a new start” in Syrian-Palestinian joint action. Hamas’ rapprochement is likely a direct result of the slow creep of normalization initiatives between Israel and other Middle East states in recent years.
Yet Hamas’ support will be of no help in the Arab League, where the Palestinian seat is taken by the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), which runs the West Bank. Syria and the PLO have had frosty relations since the 1980s, which were exacerbated by the PLO’s peace treaty with Israel in 1993. Nevertheless, the PLO did not take sides during the Syrian war and, since 2015, the relationship has thawed. A delegation from Fatah (the largest party within the PLO) also visited Damascus in 2022. During the visit, the head of the delegation declared that “Syria’s being outside the Arab League is a disgrace to all Arabs. Syria has been a founding state of the league and must be readmitted to it.”