Khorshid Delli
Contrary to the assertions made by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his Minister of Defense Hulusi Akar that Turkey will not withdraw its observation posts from northwestern Syria, Turkey suddenly began to withdraw from these posts, starting with the largest in Morek in Syria’s Hama countryside. This step came amid complete Turkish silence, which prompted observers to question the reasons that prompted Turkey to take this step.
In an attempt to answer this question, analysts believe that there are reasons behind the Turkish move, perhaps the most prominent of which are:
- These posts have become besieged by the Syrian government army (SAA), and the access to them has become difficult, as their supply for about a year has been exclusively in coordination with Russia.
- These posts have lost their military usefulness, are no longer able to perform their function, and have become a burden on Turkey.
- Russia, because of Turkey sending mercenaries from northwestern Syria to the Caucasus, has escalated its pressure on Turkey in Idlib, and is calling for it to withdraw from these posts and remove heavy weapons from Idlib. Because of that, the military talks between the two sides failed during the past month in Turkey, at a time when Turkey is facing huge Russian pressure.
- Turkey is genuinely afraid of an attack by the SAA with Russian support on these posts. If such an attack happened and Turkish soldiers were killed there, it would cost Erdogan dearly at home.
- This Turkish step came after Ankara’s failure to force Syria to withdraw its forces from the vicinity of these posts to the borders of the Sochi Agreement, as happened during the understanding last March between the Russian and Turkish sides following the violent war that broke out between the Syrian and Turkish armies.
These reasons emerge more from political analysis than available facts, accompanied by Turkish and Russian silence, a silence that left the door open to inquiries and questions, especially in light of approaching deals over the fate of northweast Syria between Turkey and the United States on the one hand, and Turkey and Russia on the other hand.
Every Turkish step in Idlib is taking place in coordination with Russia, which leads to three basic scenarios regarding the interpretation of the Turkish move, which are:
- The scenario of the deal, which is a scenario promoted by the Turkish-backed opposition armed groups. According to this deal between Russia and Turkey, the agreement is based on Turkey withdrawing from its observation posts and securing the perimeter of the international road (M4) from Aleppo to Latakia and from Aleppo to Hama in exchange for Russia’s permission for a military operation on Tal Rifaat. Russia has already rejected the Turkish offer, which included permission for operations in Manbij and Tal Rifaat, and the proponents of this theory are proposing that the Turkish operation will follow the process of completing the withdrawal of Turkish observation posts, which is an estimated period of about two months, given that the dismantling of each point takes more than a week.
- The scenario of defeat under pressure, which stems from the fact that Turkey lost the military prowess from the presence of its observation posts (eight observation posts distributed between the governorates of Hama, Aleppo, Idlib, and Latakia), and that the method of withdrawing these posts, the Turkish silence, and the failure to announce an agreement about it with the Russians are all indicators which confirm this undeclared Turkish defeat.
- The military action scenario, which is promoted by the fact that Turkey is redeploying its military forces, as the posts that were evacuated were transferred to the south of Zawiya Mountain, amid the establishment of new military bases and observation posts there and in conjunction with the continued passage of military equipment, heavy weapons, radar, and soldiers to Idlib governorate through the Kafr Lossin crossing.
Accordingly, they believe that Turkey’s move comes within the framework of preparing for a new round of war, in light of the SAA’s insistence, with the support of Russia and Iran, on taking over new areas in Idlib, and they confirm the Turkish rejection of Russia’s request to withdraw heavy weapons comes in this context.
In all cases, it is possible to stop at three important points when talking about the dimensions of the Turkish move and its repercussions:
The first: Turkey’s withdrawal of its observation posts is taking place in coordination with Russia, which means that the maps and understandings that took place between the two sides are not fixed, but rather are subject to considerations of circumstances at each stage. They are not dependent on the situation in Syria only, but rather are related to current events such as the war in Libya, the ongoing war between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the Karabakh / Artsakh region, and the Turkish-Greek-European escalation in the eastern Mediterranean.
The second: The lack of any credibility of Turkish promises to the Syrians, as Turkey’s move to withdraw its posts has left nearly half a million Syrians in these areas facing an unknown fate, and they must either accept reconciliation with the Syrian government or move deeper into Idlib, which will increase the suffering of the people there.
The same applies to the way Turkey deals with the armed opposition groups, as they have become merely a tool in its hand without any consideration for any moral value or goal, especially since these groups have no decision-making power. They are fully under Turkish command, and perhaps what confirms this matter is its silence about Turkey withdrawing from its posts, which is a stab in the back for them.
The third: That Idlib will turn into an arena of major assassinations. Perhaps the news that Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS, formerly al-Nusra Front) has started a campaign to confiscate weapons from the people and that it has taken military measures suggests that the front is preparing for military action against the Guardians of Religion Organization, which operates outside Turkish control and fights other groups controlling Idlib.
In any case, until the full scale of Turkey’s withdrawal from its observation posts becomes clear, it is obvious that Turkey has failed to use these posts as a bargaining chip with the Russian to increase its influence in northwestern Syria.
Its continues to trade in the blood of Syrians and turns them into mere mercenaries in its wars.
It has turned North and East Syria into a bargaining chip with the major powers, especially Russia, over the other arenas (the Caucasus and Libya) that they have ignited.
Without a doubt, the previous facts confirm the extent of the error of the Turkish bets on wars in the realization of Erdogan’s regional political project, especially after the burning squares turned into heavy burdens on both foreign and domestic Turkish policy, which indicates that the prices of these bets will be costly in the next stage.
Especially in light of its economic and financial repercussions on the Turkish interior, which began to groan under the weight of Erdogan’s policy and his involvement in many wars, no one knows how and when it will end.