QAMISHLI, Syria (North Press) – Since 2017, the Kazakh capital has undergone two name changes, saw the leader of the country deposed, and was the site of a popular insurgency which was put down with the help of Russian troops. The greatest reliability may just be offered by the dozens of Russian, Turkish, Iranian, and Syrian diplomats who descend on the city every few months, seeking a solution to the war in Syria. Between June 20 and 21, the so-called ‘Astana process’ held its 20th session. Among the central issues has been the attempt to harmonize the interests of the Turkish and Syrian governments. Many in northeast Syria worry that this may be achieved at the expense of the country’s Kurds.
Setting the stage
Delegations from Russia, Iran, Turkey and Syria kicked off meetings in Kazakhstan’s capital yesterday, June 20. The quadrilateral meeting was attended by Ahmad Touma, the Syrian opposition’s interim Prime Minister, as well as officials from Jordan, Iraq and Lebanon. The UN’s Special Envoy to Syria, Geir Pederson, was also in attendance. The Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) was not invited.
All sides had made their positions clear before arriving in Astana. Syria’s Deputy Foreign Minister Ayman Soussan reiterated that a Turkish withdrawal from northern Syria would be the “entry point” to negotiations with Ankara. He added that “combating terrorism is not selective.” Ankara wants a Turkish-Syrian normalization to be based on combating the AANES, which Ankara considers to be terrorists. Yet it also backs Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a group with jihadist roots, in Idlib.
In the week before the Astana talks, Turkey’s armed forces launched large-scale attacks against northeast Syria. These attacks did not just target the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), but also killed eight Syrian army troops and one Russian troop. Yesterday, a Turkish drone strike killed two high-ranking AANES politicians and their driver, and injured another. As North Press previously reported, Erdogan’s government is continuing to fight the AANES on its border while it attempts to resettle the roughly 4 million refugees it hosts and normalize relations with Damascus.
Before the meeting, Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister, Mikhail Bogdanov, accused the US of not being interested in “resolving the Kurdish issue in Syria” by preventing the AANES from negotiating with Damascus. He added that “the American forces support the Kurdish AANES, which opposes the unity of the Syrian lands.” According to Syria TV, Damascus recently closed its communication channels with the AANES, refusing all settlement offers from the latter. Russia has reportedly not intervened.
The AANES hit back against the Russian accusations hours later. Its Foreign Relations Department issued a statement saying, “we reaffirm, as we have always, that we were and still are ready for dialogue with all parties … including Damascus, and we have called more than once for Russia to play a guarantor role in this framework. The Russian Foreign Ministry knows very well … the position of the Syrian regime, which is not open to change.”
“The statements of the Russian Foreign Ministry do not represent the reality of the situation,” the Department added, “especially since they were made hours before the Astana meeting, which raises our suspicions and confirms that they may come in the context of appeasing the other parties of the Astana group, creating a hostile impression of the Autonomous Administration, and thus leading to hostile and negative decisions against us.” The Foreign Relations Department added that the AANES was not beholden to any foreign powers.
Russia has long aimed to harmonize the Syrian and Turkish governments’ interests. Russia, together with Iran, has been the main backer of the al-Assad government. On the other hand, Russian President Vladimir Putin has found a working partner in his Turkish counterpart despite Turkey’s occupation of northern Syria and support for jihadist groups. Moscow has thus attempted to establish a ‘roadmap’ that would normalize relations between the two countries.
Russia itself made a show of force hours before the meeting by conducting a number of airstrikes that targeted HTS-controlled Idlib, injuring two people, this morning. The HTS militants shelled Syrian army positions in return.
Astana vista?
Few parties to the meeting had any hopes of achieving anything this time around. Geir Pederson confidently told reporters that, “for the time being, a comprehensive solution is not doable.” On June 12, Russia’s ambassador to Syria told Al-Watan, a state paper, that, “restoring what was destroyed in twelve years is difficult to achieve in a few weeks or months … the positions of the two sides [Turkey and Syria] are still far from each other.” Al-Monitor, a news site, concluded there were “few signs of process” in Astana before the meeting’s end. It also quoted an expert saying that the Astana format had “outlived its purpose and function.”
But even the staunchest pessimist could not have predicted that it would be the host country itself who would abruptly conclude the meeting. On the second day of deliberations, Kazakh Deputy Foreign Minister Kanat Tumysh unexpectedly stated that the goals of the format had been achieved. “Taking into account Syria’s return into the Arab family, we propose officially declaring the 20th meeting under the Astana process the final one,” it added, leaving the visiting diplomats flabbergasted.
“We cannot say that the Astana process is over,” Russian negotiator Alexander Lavrentyev said. “But if the Kazakh side has decided that they need to be moved to a different location, we will discuss that and pick one.”
A common statement as the meeting concluded “recognized the importance of advancing [the normalization] process on the basis of goodwill and good-neighborly relations to combat terrorism, create proper conditions for safe, voluntary and dignified return of Syrians […], revitalize political process and ensure unimpeded flow of humanitarian aid to the whole of Syria.”
The AANES loomed large in the participants’ concluding remarks. The statement adds that “[Participating parties] expressed their determination to continue working together to combat terrorism in all its forms and manifestations and stand against separatist agendas aimed at undermining the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Syria and threatening the national security of the neighboring countries, including through cross-border attacks and infiltrations.” Moreover, it “Reiterated their opposition to the illegal seizure and transfer of oil revenues that should belong to Syria,” in a clear jab at US control of oil fields in Deir ez-Zor. Furthermore, it “Condemned the actions of countries supporting terrorist entities, including illegitimate self-rule initiatives in the north-east of Syria.”
Cause for concern?
Syria’s Kurds often worry about a Damascus-Ankara axis plotting their demise. No doubt, both governments do engage in limited intelligence-sharing. Both would rather the AANES never existed. However, such worries hide the fact that the two states pursue very different goals in northeast Syria. More often than not, their actions in the region have been at odds.
Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, has historically intervened in Syria, first and foremost, to deny the country’s AANES, seeing the local democracy project as one and the same as the guerrilla warfare of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). But the AANES is not just a security concern. The very existence of such a project also threatens the idea of the Turkish Republic as a unitary state. Not eight years ago, over a dozen localities across its Kurdish-dominated southeast declared their autonomy, in large part inspired by events in Rojava (or Syrian Kurdistan). As a result, the Turkish armed forces razed Kurdish cities like Cizre and Nusaybin.
Their twin cities across the border in war-ravaged Syria – Derik (al-Malikiyah) and Qamishli – never saw comparable devastation. This is because, Bashar al-Assad, unlike Erdogan, worries not about Kurdish autonomy itself. Damascus was pivotal in enabling the AANES to gain autonomy in the northeast. The al-Assad family has a long history of conspiring with Kurdish parties, including the PKK – much longer than it has had diplomatic relations with Ankara.
Moreover, Bashar’s regime, like his father’s, is based largely on harboring the manufactured anxiety of Syria’s ethnic and religious minorities. Until recently, al-Assad ruled by convincing his own Alawite sect, as well as Syria’s Christians, Druze, Shi’a and the upper crust of Sunni urbanites, that a radicalized Sunni horde was out to get them. Kurds have historically not been part of this ‘in-group’. However, given the current realities, any post-war settlement will have to accommodate them. Instead, al-Assad’s ire has been reserved for the pact that, since 2014, Kurdish autonomy has been a Trojan horse for a US presence in the east of Syria. Damascus can make peace with West Kurdistan, but not with the West.
The ‘points of agreement’ scrambled together in Astana, before the Kazakh government decided to pull the plug, reek of attempted intimidation. Moscow and especially Damascus are continuing their time-tested tactic of scaring Syria’s Kurds with the prospect of a Turkish offensive enough to allow Syrian troops to regain further ground in northeast Syria. To a certain degree, this game works flawlessly: the only thing matching Turkey’s aggression is America’s timidity. Since 2018, this has allowed Syrian and Russian soldiers to push across the Euphrates and into the eastern Jazira region without a single shot fired. The two allies are banking on the fact that, when push comes to shove, US troops will leave their Syrian allies, as they did in 2019, and the AANES will lose its leverage. Such a scenario may happen yet, but it will not be plotted in Astana.