QAMISHLI, Syria (North Press) – Many Western observers had predicted his demise; for the umpteenth time, he proved them wrong. Recep Tayyip Erdogan will remain at the helm of Turkey’s government, a position he has ravished in for the past two decades. What will this mean for Turkey and the world?
The opposition
His political opposition put on a tough fight. Balancing rabid nationalists, liberals, disgruntled Erdogan supporters, and courting left-wing Kurds, the opposition leader, Kemal Kilicdaroglu, managed to put together a disparate alliance. It under-performed. Yet he managed to force the president into an unprecedented runoff election, even as Erdogan mobilized state and media for his electoral campaign, and, in the final count, he convinced 47,8 percent of the electorate to cast their ballot for him (or against the president), according to Anadolu Agency, a state-controlled news site.
Observers had already been pessimistic about the opposition’s ability to rule had they won. Their loss both of the presidency and in parliament means the unholy alliance may fall apart even quicker than before. But if they hope to succeed at all, they will have to cooperate again.
Right-wing nationalism
As was highlighted in a previous North Press analysis, the 2023 elections have showcased the undue influence of Turkey’s far-right. With nearly one in four Turks voting for a fringe far-right nationalist party for parliament, it is among the highest in Western democracies. This is especially noteworthy given that the two mainstream parties – Erdogan’s AKP and Kilicdaroglu’s CHP – have veered hard-right as well.
Since it was forced into a coalition with the secular-nationalist MHP in 2015, the conservative AKP party has adopted some of its xenophobic rhetoric, including regarding the country’s ethnic and religious minorities. The opposition alliance’s narrative was controlled first by the MHP splinter party, the IYI party, before being entirely derailed by even more hard-line groups after May 14.
Following a disappointing run in the first round of elections, Kilicdaroglu’s team tried to court the ATA Alliance and its leader, Umit Ozdag, who had received 5.2 percent of the presidential vote. Kilicdaroglu, a soft-spoken Alevi of Kurdish origin, was suddenly heard railing against Syrians in the country and demonizing the country’s Kurds. While he had once sat down with the pro-Kurdish HDP party, in the two weeks between the first and second rounds he hardened his stance, saying he would not free the dozens of unfairly imprisoned HDP politicians.
These antics seemed to have worked to some extent. He gained nearly a million votes between May 14 and May 28. Erdogan received 700,000 extra votes. Yet it was not enough to dethrone the man who had spent nearly a decade perfecting his far-right rhetoric. In the end, he beat his opponent by 2,3 million votes.
The Kurds at home and abroad
After the first round of elections, a North Press analysis opined that Kurds could not be accused of not showing up for the opposition candidate. Was it true this time? For the most part, yes. In Turkey’s 15 Kurdish-majority provinces (Kars, Igdir, Agri, Van, Mus, Hakkari, Bitlis, Sirnak, Siirt, Mardin, Batman, Diyarbakir, Bingol, Tunceli, and Sanliurfa), 58.65 percent voted for Kilicdaroglu and 39.83 percent for Erdogan. These are within less of a percentage point of difference from the first round results.
Yet a noticeable number of Kilicdaroglu voters stayed home. Overall, the second round attracted fewer voters than the first. But the drop in the southeast was noticeable. The votes cast here (4,5 million in the second round) were about 8.5 percent of the total; on May 14 they had been 8.8 percent of the total. And Kilicdaroglu was the bigger loser. 160,000 less people showed up for him compared to 43,000 less for Erdogan – a likely consequence of the opposition leader’s virulent rhetoric after his initial loss.
As Erdogan extends his presidency, Kurds in Turkey and abroad fear what may come next. The president ran an equally hate-field campaign against so-called “terrorists” – a catch-all term which includes both the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and elected HDP politicians. In past elections, the conservative Kurdish vote carried him to power, but many Kurds may have divested from Erdogan for good. The fact that Erdogan was able to achieve a victory without a majority of the Kurdish vote this time around does not bode well for their future.
Kurds in Syria, too, are weary. Erdogan has said he will not withdraw his forces from occupied territory in Syria and promised to continue his fight against Kurdish forces in the country.
Recently, his interior minister made claims to the city of Aleppo. Another invasion in Syria – it would be the fourth – may occur sooner than expected. Turkey’s proxy militias on the ground were jubilant as last-night’s election results came in. Erdogan’s opponent had vowed to stop supporting Islamist forces in Syria.
Erdogan’s Syria policy
The president’s next steps on Syria are not immediately clear. His willingness to maintain the current occupation of northern Syria, his attacks against Kurdish forces, the anti-refugee campaign he, too, ran, and the ongoing normalization talks Turkey’s government is holding with Syria seem to pursue contradictory aims.
Ankara plans for the ‘willing’ resettlement of the roughly four million Syrians in Turkey to zones it occupies in the country. If needed, Turkey’s armed forces may invade more Kurdish-held territory in order to create an extra buffer zone on its border – another policy goal.
Yet the regional normalization initiative with Syria’s Bashar al-Assad seems to have thrown a wrench in this calculation. Damascus is being welcomed back into the bloc of Middle East politics, including the Arab League, which has denounced “foreign interference” in Syria. Damascus’ new friends have also suggested to merge the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a group Ankara says is connected to the PKK, into its standing army.
Al-Assad has made any face-to-face meeting with Erdogan dependent on a full withdrawal of Turkish forces from Syria. A further Turkish invasion of Syria would no doubt further deteriorate the two government’s relationship. Although talks are ongoing, it is clear Ankara needs Damascus more than the opposite is true.