[Part II]
Imperialism with Russian characteristics
At first glance, China and Russia seem to be following the same agenda in the Middle East. China joins Russia in voting down almost all the same UN Security Council resolutions regarding the region, and both repeat similar platitudes about the “territorial integrity” of the Syrian state ad nauseam. As mentioned previously, the two countries have attempted to form a counter-pole to US dominance. Yet, in the Middle East, their roles could hardly be more different.
For one, Russia’s involvement in the region goes back centuries. The USSR propped up a number of Baathist and Arab Nationalist regimes in the region, like those in Syria, Iraq and Egypt. It also had close ties with Algeria, Libya, South Yemen and a number of Palestinian liberation groups, such as the PFLP and PLO. More recently, it has pursued joint goals with the Islamic Republic of Iran, especially in Syria.
Russia’s president, Vladimir Putin, has worked closely with Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdogan, despite backing opposing sides in Syria, Libya and the Caucasus. Turkey is also a long-time NATO ally of the West. However, Erdogan has flirted with Russia for the past two decades, letting Russia’s oligarchs park their money in Turkey and cooperating with Russia in Syria. In 2017, Erdogan went ahead on a deal worth $2.5 billion to buy the Russian S-400 anti-aircraft missile system, angering Washington.
Vladimir Putin has also courted Israel’s Benjamin Netanyahu, going as far as to say that the Jewish state is part of the “Russian cultural sphere” due to the high number of Russian and Ukrainian Jews among its population. Both states share an understanding within Syria, though Israel has repeatedly bombed government forces in the country. The Netanyahu government, on the other hand, has been reluctant to come to Ukraine’s aid after the 2022 Russian invasion despite its strong ties to the US.
Russia has also not shied away from implementing its policy in the Middle East by force – on the road and off it, too. The USSR mounted a disastrous invasion of Afghanistan in the 1980s. Russia has kept a naval base in Syria’s Tartus since 1971. During the Syrian war, Russian airstrikes turned the tides of war in favour of the Bashar al-Assad government. It has also deployed ground troops and the infamous Wagner Group irregulars in the country. Today, Russia runs military bases in the west and north of Syria. The regions controlled by the Syrian government are divided between Iranian and Russian spheres of influence.
Iran and Russia have established closer economic ties since the Ukraine invasion. Trade between the two countries has jumped from $1.5 billion to $2 billion in an effort to overcome US sanctions together. Recently, Russia has overtaken China as Iran’s largest outside investor. However, the allies are deeply divided over Syria, where they support opposing factions within the government and compete for the spoils of war, Anand Gopal, a Syria observer says. These divisions will only become more pronounced.
Since the fall of the USSR, Russia’s political projection for the Middle East has been somewhat of a mystery. Socialism is out of vogue; not even Syria’s Baathist attempt to define the al-Assad government in that way. Russia is also fearful of jihadist movements, which have been popular with some Muslim minorities of the Caucasus. Democracy-building movements are out of the question. What remains is a small group of embattled autocrats with anti-Western positions. Since the West’s botched 2011 toppling of Muammar Gaddafi in Libya, Russia has concentrated on denying the West another such ‘win’.
Russia has followed this policy in the UN Security Council, but also through naked violence. But it is learning a lesson the US learned two decades ago: supporting autocrats against the people they rule is dangerous business. The main two Russian allies in the region – the governments of Syria and Iran – are deeply unpopular with the population at large. In the case of Syria, it would not survive without being propped up by external forces. A majority of Iranians, too, are looking west for inspiration, not further east, as widespread protests have shown. Even the two most Russophile Western-aligned autocrats in the region – Erdogan and Netanyahu – seem to be on their last legs, set to be replaced by more pro-Western governments within the year.
Unlike China, or even the US, Russia has very little to offer Middle Eastern states in the long run. Since the invasion of Ukraine, Russia’s economy has been embattled; few states would risk the sanctions to conduct business with an international pariah state. Moreover, Russia’s economy is not attractive. It’s GDP is barely larger than Iran’s, and a sixth that of the US. Over half of its exports are fuel and gas (around 53%), which the Middle East does not need. Russian wheat alone represents a valuable commodity for Middle Eastern states. Egypt imported $2.55 billion of the stuff in 2019; Turkey $1.4 billion. Yet it is hardly enough to bear Russia’s imperialist ambitions.
What to expect
A Foreign Affairs op-ed on China’s role in the Saudi-Iranian deal called it “a huge leap forward in [China’s] competition with Washington.” The agreement has the potential “to transform the Middle East by rearranging its great powers, replacing the current division between Arabs and Israel with a complex web of relations, and linking the region to China’s global ambitions,” the authors write.
China’s appearance onto the scene of Middle East diplomacy is indeed striking. It fits within its wider world systems theory, outlined above, favouring stability, trade and economic growth over ideology and democratic development. Yet it will hardly lead to the foundation of a counter-pole in the Middle East. As the above section outlined, Russia is not a reliable partner in this project; its impact on the region is waning.
And China’s new-found role after the recent deal should also not be exaggerated. Its trade with Iran remains limited. According to The Economist, Iranian officials thought its partnership with Beijing might bring $400 billion in investment, but Chinese firms only produced about $135 million. Iran sends a lot of cheap oil to China without receiving much in return.
The agreement will also only lead to a temporary lull in tensions. It has not resolved the issue of Iran’s nuclear program, which will take much more intensive and multilateral diplomacy. And in making peace between the Gulf and Iran, the deal has alienated Israel, which was in the midst of establishing an anti-Iranian alliance with the same countries. Israeli airstrikes on Iranian positions in Syria and on Iranian territory have shot up this year. The March deal is by no means the panacea for all of the Middle East’s ills.
Similarly, not all issues can be resolved with trade and investment. Saudi Arabia sells cheap oil to and buys arms from the US in part to finance its own protection. China is hardly a substitute for such assurances, as “no one expects the People’s Liberation Army to ride to the rescue when Gulf security is threatened,” as The Economist writes. China seems unwilling to get its hands dirty in the region.
At a recent meeting between Putin and China’s Chairman, Xi Jinping, the latter bade the former farewell with the words, “right now there are changes – the likes of which we haven’t seen for 100 years – and we are the ones driving these changes together.” If indeed true, very little of it will be perceivable to people in the Middle East. They have seen foreign aggression and broken promises before.