Beirut -North-Press Agency
Khorshid Delli
Since the beginning of the Syrian crisis, the Turkish government has practiced a deliberate policy on how to organize the future Syrian scene, a policy which based on two main pillars: the first involved in bringing political Islamic forces, specifically the Muslim Brotherhood to power in case of the overthrow of the Syrian government, based on ideological and political considerations which formed the essence of the Turkish foreign policy towards the Arab world since the Arab Spring uprisings.
The second: the removing the Kurdish component from the political formations which are being established in preparation for the stage of the political solution, and the work to prevent the establishment of a Kurdish political entity in northeastern Syria for the fears of the repercussions of such a matter on the Kurdish issue inside Turkey.
Thus, since the beginning of the Syrian crisis, Turkey has strenuously sought to take all steps which hinder the process of turning the Kurds into a real force on the ground in Syria. In order to understand how this policy began, it is necessary to concentrate on the steps which were taken by Turkey in the first stage of the Syrian crisis:
- In April 2012, when Syrian Kurdish parties met in Qamishli to arrange their internal situation in light of the developments in Syria, Recep Erdogan who was then the Turkish Prime Minister, hurried to warn the Syrian government from the risk of partition, in order to pit the Syrian leadership on the Kurds after this leadership began to grant the Kurds the Syrian nationality in an attempt to win them alongside the Syrian leadership in the current crisis.
- When the oppositional National Coordination Committee for the Democratic Change Forces in Syria was established under the chairmanship of Hassan Abdel Azim in June 2011, the latter received a phone call from the then Turkish ambassador in Damascus asking him to remove the Kurdish component representative by the Democratic Union Party (PYD) from the Committee in return of Turkey's support for the Committee.
- Exerting more pressure on the Iraqi Kurds, especially the former president of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) Massoud Barzani, in order to support the Syrian Kurdish parties in the Syrian National Coalition, the Kurdish National Council parties (ENKS), in exchange for pressure on the PYD, which is considered by Turkey the Syrian branch of the PKK, aiming to deepen the Kurdish-Kurdish disputes and block the PYD from the control of the Kurdish areas.
- Turkish overt support for the Syrian armed opposition groups during the attack of these groups on the city of Ras al-Ain/Sere Kaniye in 2012, so as not to fall under the control of the Kurds, specifically the PYD, which had then begun to form the People's Protection Units (YPG).
- Turkey asked former PYD co-chair Saleh Moslen twice to visit Turkey. On both times, Muslim met with Turkish officials, asking him to join the Kurds in the armed opposition groups to topple the Syrian regime, but the Turkish request was rejected.
In fact, these early steps formed the essence of the Turkish policy towards the Syrian Kurdish component before the Syrian crisis witnessed significant field and political developments, which made Turkey to jump over the strategy of overthrowing the Syrian regime, and to make its main priority in fighting the Kurdish component, but the biggest obstacle which emerged in this field was the coalition formed between the Kurds and the United States administration after the battle of Kobani, which succeeded in defeating ISIS by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in the east of the Euphrates. These victories turned the SDF into a balanced force which included various northeastern Syrian components presenting a de-centralized nominee of the rule in the country. While the US support for these forces has become a permanent controversy in U.S.-Turkish relations, hence the Turkish insistence on fighting the Kurds immediately after being excluded from the Geneva negotiations and later from the Constitutional Committee, which it has held its first meeting on Wednesday.
From exclusion to aggression
Turkey hasn't only put political and diplomatic pressure to exclude the Kurds from the Syrian scene, but it moved to the stage of direct aggression, when it announced the launch of the operation (Olive Branch) on January 20, 2018, which ended on the 18th of March of the same year, by occupying the entire Afrin region, which is known for its Kurdish nationality. The Turkish aggression destroyed dozens of towns and villages and displaced about a quarter of a million Kurds from their homes. Then, Turkey moved to the stage of the demographic change in the region by settling armed groups and their families. Irrespective of the fragility of the Turkish arguments and pretexts about occupying Afrin, the international and regional lenient attitude towards Erdogan by virtue of the policy of interests in international relations, encouraged Erdogan to consider repeating the scenario of the occupation of Afrin in other regions, and therefore he focused heavily on the area of Manbij in the post-Afrin occupation, before directing his link to areas in the east of the Euphrates, aiming at separating the regions under the control of SDF.
The idea of establishing a safe zone in northeastern Syria was the gateway to his new aggression under the so-called Operation Peace Spring, which mobilized the most powerful weapons and forces, in addition to tens of thousands of Syrian Islamist militants who are part of the so-called the National Army.
In his aggression, Erdogan started from three levels:
The first, the Russian understanding of Erdogan's policy in northern Syria within the framework of the Russian target to the U.S. presence in eastern Euphrates in the framework of Russia's attempt to contain Turkey and getting it out of NATO, and on the basis that, the Turkish occupation of northeastern areas of Syria is temporary and will end with agreements between Damascus and Ankara after the advancement of a political solution.
The second, the U.S. understanding, specifically by President Trump of the Turkish military operation in the framework of a political vision launched by the U.S. envoy to Syria James Jeffrey, a vision based on the need to win Turkey alongside the U.S. and the use its role in the face of the Iranian and Russian projects in Syria.
The third, the internal dimension which forms Erdogan's permanent obsession, and this dimension has been strengthened after the loss of his ruling party, Justice and Development Party (AKP) in the municipal elections and the split of senior party leaders such as Ahmet Davutoglu and Ali Babacan from the party, and the announcement of their intention to establish two new parties opposed to Erdogan's policy.
These internal developments led Erdogan to turn the eyes of the interior abroad from the point of view of protecting national security, while the main objective was to create a state of internal mobilization behind him to restore what his party lost in the elections and to hit the opposition, which united and agreed to oppose him, and this is what happened. The Turkish opposition has lost ground in supporting Erdogan's aggression against northern Syria and was divided again, which favored Erdogan's primary goal of strengthening his authority and his party at home.
Undoubtedly, the ongoing Turkish aggression against northeastern Syria under the pretext of fighting terrorism and preventing the establishment of a Kurdish entity, is now a great danger on the Kurdish presence first, on the unity of Syria second, and on the security and stability of this region third, which requires the major countries concerned with the Syrian crisis to take a serious stance to put an end to these serious risks.