Khorsid Delli
Erdogan's motives for signing two memoranda of understanding with Libya, specifically with the Presidential Council of Fayez al-Sarraj are many. The first memorandum is military, which gives Turkey the freedom to use the Libyan airspace, establishing military bases on Libyan territories without permission from its authorities, the second is marine and related to energy extraction from the Mediterranean Sea. Both memoranda provoked the Libyan, regional and international angry reactions.
What is remarkable about the Turkish behavior after the signing of the two memoranda is the Turkish parliament’s rushing to ratify them, and Ankara’s indifference to the rejecting responses, especially from the Libyan parties which considered the signing of the two memoranda in the manner that took place is illegal, as the signing of foreign agreements according to the Libyan al-Skheirat agreement requires the sign of all members of the Libyan Presidential Council, and they are nine members. While the one who signed the memorandum was only the president of the council, which lost the legitimacy when signing the two memoranda. Libya is also under Chapter 7 of the U.N. Security Council, which deprives it legally from the sovereign agreements.
The question that arises here is, why is this Erdogan’s adventure in the Mediterranean from the gateway of Libya? In an attempt to answer this question, it is necessary to consider the following:
First: Erdogan's signature on the two memoranda was a response to the marine agreements signed by Egypt, Greece and Cyprus, and an attempt to impose a fait accompli policy on these countries contrary to the international law of the sea, which stipulates that the marine agreements should be between the riparian countries, as the main Turkish goal behind that is to have bargaining chips when proposing political solutions to the rights of the states in the Mediterranean.
Second: Turkey, and after making sure that its coast doesn't contain the energy that is a strategic issue for it because of its increasing needs, wants these memoranda to make itself a focal point among the regions of extraction, supply and export to Europe, this matter is directed mainly towards Greece, Egypt, Israel, Cyprus and the European countries which are seeking to supply energy lines away from the Turkish borders.
Third: Building legal foundations and strong elements to participate in the international forums which were formed on how to manage energy sources of oil and gas in the Mediterranean, especially after Egypt’s success in forming an international forum in this regard with the participation of maritime states in the Mediterranean and with the absence of Turkey.
Fourth: Strengthening the Turkish cards in the maritime conflict with Greece, which has the European support. The Turkish-Libyan Marine Memorandum of Understanding ignores the situation of the Greek island of Crete which separates the waters between Turkey and Libya, especially since the eastern region of Libya is outside the control of the al-Wifaq Government of the Presidential Council, and thus the Turkish-Libyan agreement aims to create a new maritime reality vis-a-vis Greece.
Fifth: The Turkish goal behind the two memoranda exceeds the energy dimension to politics. al-Wefaq Government represented by al-Sarraj represents the Muslim Brotherhood organization in Libya, and it controls the capital Tripoli, through armed groups to which Turkey provides various types of weaponry, and thus, Erdogan wants to consolidate the rule of this group in favor of his agenda in Libya and the whole of Africa within the framework of the so-called new Ottomanism. This policy increases the intensity of the regional political confrontation, especially with Egypt under President Abdul Fattah al-Sisi's rule after his success in ending the rule of the Muslim Brotherhood Organization in Egypt.
Indeed, Erdogan's policy in Libya seems like a great political adventure, as it stirred the conflict with Greece, Cyprus and the European Union in general, as well as it has escalated the conflict with Egypt, especially since Libya is a neighboring country to Egypt and important to its national security, as it constitutes a new point of tension in the relationship with the Arab countries, especially the Arab Gulf countries, which opposes Turkey's strategy in Libya strongly, and perhaps the most dangerous matter here is that, the Turkish move increases the pace of internal conflict in Libya between the National Army led by Major-General Khalifa Haftar and Tabraq Parliament on the one hand, and the Government of the National Reconciliation and the armed groups in Tripoli on the other hand. Accordingly, observers expect the repercussions of the Turkish-Libyan agreement would be significant on the Libyan scene, especially since Tabraq Parliament considered the agreement as an aggression against the Libyan sovereignty. In front of this reality, the Libyan scene seems open to important developments, perhaps the most important of which are:
- The option of organizing the Libyan army led by Major-General Haftar to launch a major campaign to control the capital, Tripoli, not only to eliminate the control of the armed groups over the city, but also to drop the new agreement with Turkey, especially since this endeavor has Egyptian, Arab Gulf, and French support. Perhaps this is likely to happen, because there are reports that indicate the losing of al-Wifaq Government if its power elements in Tripoli.
- The move of the Parliament of Eastern Libya (Tabraq) to drop the Turkish-Libyan agreement, especially since the agreement is illegal, due to the legal flaws in the legitimacy of the Libyan party that signed the agreement as we mentioned earlier.
- Parallel to this Libyan internal situation, there is an Arab tendency to hold a meeting at the level of the Arab League to delegitimize the Libyan Presidential Council led by al-Sarraj, since the agreement it had signed with the Turkish side harms the Arab national security, and the rights of the Mediterranean Arab countries.
In fact, it is clear the Turkish-Libyan agreement came in favor of a Turkish strategy that Erdogan outlined in his struggle with the regional countries over energy in the Mediterranean, and to overturn the regional alliances that were formed in this context, as well as more domination on the Libyan scene via Muslim Brotherhood groups, but at the same time, this agreement opened the door to an internal Libyan move with the Arab, regional and international support to end the control of al-Wifaq Government and its armed groups over the capital, Tripoli.
Undoubtedly, if this scenario saw the light, it will have catastrophic effects on Erdogan's endeavor and his new adventure in the Mediterranean from the Libyan gate.