AKP autumn, the beginning of Erdogan’s end

Turkish President Erdogan

Dr. Ahmad Yousef  

 

Turkey and its economy suffer from political consequences of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) practices which has been controlling the country's capabilities since 2002, despite the appearances which strongly inspired the development of its sectors that witnessed a fake escalation, as the truth of which was later and confirmed – during populist attractions, away from the logic of the politicians who are seeking economic social development – in Erdogan's speeches, in an unrelenting attempt to cover up his economic policies and snapped political behaviors of the Turkish state and society, which are burdened by the repercussions of those policies and behaviors that are totally contradicting the geopolitical developments in the Middle East, which form the basis for a comprehensive change in the structure of the system that has been in it for nearly a century. This leads to the development of the assistant climate, not only in widening the chasm of social dissociation among the components of the state in its current form, but also in the party from which Erdogan drew all his strength and his might to control the will of 80 million through his transition from the popularly elected ruler to the chosen ruler against the latter.  

In his movements, he relied on employing all state institutions by building networks of corruption and state terrorism to ensure that, he is the ruler God's will.

 

The factors which let AKP to go on united and tight in leading Ankara after Turkey witnessed rapid developments following the events of 2016 and the subsequent actions to undermine democratic practices in the country, are now absent in the Turkish scene after high voices within the party which rejecting to direct Turkey towards regional and global isolation, but the position of the authorities at the top of the pyramid and its narrow entourage has made it impossible to perpetuate the conflict in the internal channels of the party, and that there is no way for the opponents except to move outside the walls of the party to express their convictions and express their opinions in the fate of the Turkish political, economic and social reality in order to break the rules of Erdogan's uniqueness in leading both the party and the state. The rise of Davutoglu and Babacan is only the beginning step in the end of the honeymoon of the nationalist Islam movement in Turkey and the entry into the autumn of AKP and its leader.

 

Internal split   

The accumulation of controversial points and the multiplicity of views on internal issues, especially the Kurdish issue, by resorting to traditional remedial methods that have long been used by successive Turkish governments, have led to the emergence of complications and dangerous consequences for the entity which was founded by Mustafa Kamal on the ruins of the Ottoman state, and it reflected on the position of the party which dealt with it in blatant duplication over nearly two decades, which led to its entering into a dark tunnel confirming the lack of the possibility of going back to correct paths on all internal issues, after the opposition voices dared to start establishing its entities which are unable to make any changes at the level of the depth in the Turkish domestic policy, and its role won't exceed the limitation of the comprehensive capabilities of AKP, taking Turkey towards a state of political chaos, which may lead to social chaos, in light of the certainty of the failure of the party's economic projects.   

Successive governments for AKP haven't been able to rein inflationary pressures, reduce unemployment levels, improve credit standing and limit the expansion of the size of foreign debt, along with the emigration of some foreign capital from Turkish markets for fears of expected economic collapses due to a combination of internal factors with the development of external threats, as one cannot present more powerful explanations of the increasing numbers of the Turkish companies which are facing bankruptcy risks, except in terms of the failure of economic policies for the AKP.

 

Fall of masks externally   

The conditions of imaginary stability, which prevailed before the so-called crisis the Arab Spring in the southern land and sea borders of Turkey, helped the AKP government to postpone the fueling of the internal fire, taking advantage of a set of factors of intellectual and field dimensions which were summarized in the strategy "zero problems with the neighborhood", as it was able to expand south by building partnerships that deluded the others and served its expansionist ambitions on the peaceful basis, but the winds didn't flow as the AKP vessel desired, which strayed in the middle of the crises of the Arab Spring. It had only to put an end to its alleged strategy in order to move to the other side of the events, in an attempt to maximize the size of the gains from its expansionist policies. The top of the pyramid in the AKP authority believed that, if Turkey was achieving partial gains from its improved relations with the neighbor under its previous strategy, then it will make overall gains by taking a decision to claim and seize the opposition forces, especially those stained with an Islamist nature consistent with the aspirations and ambitions of the AKP.  

It achieved some of the positive results in the first years of the comprehensive crisis in the countries concerned, and soon, these results became burdens that the AKP have no choice but to bear them after it was further indulged in the mire of the swamps designed by the international powers, and it entered the line of no return after expanding the size of the contradictions with the neighborhood under the influence of various issues, from the Syrian issue to the Libyan one, passing through to the Cyprus issue, due to the complications it carries after the confirmed discoveries of huge quantities of gas in all the Mediterranean geography surrounding Turkey. Turkey's indulgence in difficult cases has led the international powers to open the books of the old renewed Armenian issue.   

 

The Turkish contradictions with international policy trends are a burden on AKP and its unique leadership in the fate of the Turkish people, and a strong entrance for heading towards striking its projects. Those contradictions draw features of the emergence of new powers in the Turkish scene, whose primary function is to remove these contradictions in order to protect the Turkish entity, although its manifestations are different from those prevalent in the Ataturk Republic. There is no doubt that, this forces them to work first to neutralize the AKP from the internal Turkish equation.

 

Accumulation of the legacy of the political crime (state terrorism)  

Perhaps in the early years of the AKP, the followers expected its ability to address the outstanding internal issues as a result of the accumulation of a heavy legacy of crimes against the various Turkish components, especially the Kurdish and the Christian components, and relied in their expectations on some statements and policies that appeared to be more liberal compared to the policies that preceded its reign. However, it is said that all's well that ends well. It was confirmed that the ends didn't deviate from the approach adopted to build a luxury Turkey, despite the strong initiative launched by Ocalan in his own prison in Imrali, by announcing the silence of weapons and the launch of peaceful initiatives for the most important political issue in Turkey, the AKP was unable to take any step for the success of the initiative, which makes the criminal history of modern Turkey part of the unfortunate past, in order to own the future in a participatory manner.  

The negative response to confidence-building steps may bring harm to the initiators, but it will be a black point in the path of the rejecter, and it will reduce its role until it ends up disappearing or completely neutralized by the power of truth.   

The fact is that either AKP didn't understand the importance of addressing the criminal legacy of its predecessors in the Turkish policy, or that it has received this trust from them to move it to new stages, which is more likely. In both cases, it will be the victim of that heavy legacy as its predecessors, and this fact doesn't negate that, the Turkish peoples bear the bulk of the consequences of that criminal legacy, which must sought for formulas of togetherness in order to stop them. This matter needs to change the Turkish political interface in its essence, and if the AKP is a continuation of the previously drawn chain of the value system of the Turkish state, the historical facts and the new data in the international politics confirm that, it will be the last victims of the criminal legacy which inherited from its predecessors of the rulers of the Turkish people. It can be asserted that, the AKP at the end of the second decade of the new millennium isn't the same AKP at the beginning of the first decade of it. If the followers see the beginnings as a spring, then we see the end as an autumn, and the spring has no date except with those who have the audacity and sufficient means to change the image of Turkey completely and to fold a history of dark blackness.  

Dr. Ahmad Yousef – Academic in financing policies of the economic development