Khorshid Delli
North-Press Agency
Few days after the summit of the Russian President Vladimir Putin and the Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the Turkish Ministers of Defense and Foreign Affairs are visiting Russia on Sunday to discuss the concerning issues between the two countries. So, what calls for this visit after few days of Putin-Erdogan summit? Is it right that there's something new, or there are controversial issues weren't solved in the summit of the Caesar and the Sultan, especially that the two men didn't issue any statement about Idlib?
In fact, when checking the nature of the existing relationships between Russia and Turkey, one must find himself in front of contradictory strategies on most of the regional issues in the area, and at the same time, one must find himself in front of a policy which is trying to solve these disagreements in favor of huge economic projects, in addition to the role of the relationship with Washington on how to manage these differences, as the Russian-Turkish harmony resulted from the understandings and agreements between them often hide behind deep disagreements, and with this ongoing paradox, the differences between them turn into something similar to an ember may burn and almost ignite or explode here or there. Perhaps, the most important of these disputes are:
1- Idlib file: Russia stresses the necessity for the Syrian government to regain control over Idlib governorate, so, whenever the Syrian army, with direct Russian support, launches a military campaign to advance in this governorate, whenever Turkey warns of the military escalation and provides new weapons to the armed groups in order to prevent the advance of the Syrian army, Moscow resort to saying that Turkey doesn't fulfill its obligations set out in Sochi Agreement, nor does it play an adequate role towards "Hayat Tahrir al-Sham" (formerly Jabhat al-Nusra), and later talks begin between the two sides and they often end with understandings in the form of truces or deals which don't solve the issue, while the dispute between them remains ongoing and subject to the ongoing developments.
2- SDF file: Although most of the Turkish military operations in northern Syria took place with Russian-Turkish understandings, as they happened in Afrin, Jarablus, and Sere-Kaniye (Ras al-Ain), the gradual Russian openness to the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) after the Turkish aggression known as the "Peace Spring Operation" showed a Turkish sensitivity to the Russian approach, and therefore, whenever Turkey claims that the SDF forces didn't withdraw from the entire areas stipulated in Sochi Agreement between Russia and Turkey after the (Peace Spring Operation) and threatens to resume the aggression, Moscow responds that the SDF has carried out the complete withdrawal from those areas, and expressed its surprise from these Turkish statements. In depth, Turkey fears from a Russian role which may lead to a solution agreement between the SDF and Damascus, as such an agreement would be a blow to the Turkish ambitions in north-eastern Syria, and would lead to the formation of a large force on the ground that would fight Turkey’s influence in north-eastern Syria, and eliminate the influence of affiliated armed groups.
3- Libya file: With the Turkish military intervention in Libya following Erdogan-al-Sarraj agreement, the Libyan file has become a new controversial point between Russia and Turkey, despite Putin-Erdogan's call for a ceasefire in Libya. It is proven that, Turkey supports al-Sarraj who represents the armed groups, whose control is now limited to the capital, Tripoli, while on the contrary, Russia supports the Libyan National Army led by Major General Khalifa Haftar, whose forces are making great strides to liberate Tripoli from the control of the Turkish-affiliated armed groups, which are mostly radical Islamic militant groups of al-Qaeda and the Muslim Brotherhood , where Turkey is their headquarter.
So, with the advance of the Libyan army towards Tripoli, the formal understanding between Putin and Erdogan about Libya is collapsible in light of the announcement of the Libyan army its rejection to the ceasefire and its affirmation about the necessity to regain Tripoli and blowing up Erdogan-al-Sarraj agreement, and the establishment of the Libyan national state.
4- Ukraine file: an old-new point of disagreement file between Russia and Turkey, as Turkey has repeatedly announced its refusal to Russia's annexation of Crimea in eastern Ukraine, where Turkey considers it as a part of its national security, given that its indigenous people are Ottoman Turks, while Russia rejects this logic, entirety and in detail, and rejects the Turkish intervention. Although the dispute between the two sides in this regard has abated, however, it is like dormant embers beneath the instant consensuses which may ignite at any moment.
In fact, the Russian-Turkish disputes have a historical vision stemming from the depth of the historical conflict between the Russian and Ottoman empires, and it is a vision which carries a strategic contradiction due to the conflicting policies related to the geopolitical, depth the role and the aspirations, and therefore it is possible to understand the dimensions of the Russian-Turkish controversy which doesn't stop, without what the aforementioned could mean that the understanding between the two sides lost their missionary role, especially in the Syrian crisis which emerges as a vital field for the two sides, as the factors which have stood behind the understandings are still there, and it is related firstly to the common targeting of the U.S. influence in eastern Euphrates, each for its own reasons, then, to the role of the ongoing tension in the U.S.-Turkish relationships amid Russia's ongoing attempts of getting Turkey out of the NATO in favor of its Eurasian strategy in order to record a significant victory against the NATO through Turkey, while the latter converging with Russia, as a compensation for the aggravation of the dispute with the West, both its European and American sides, and to achieve a kind of balance in its relationships with the two, in addition to the importance of the economic interests which is being enhanced between Moscow and Ankara, especially in power field and Russian gas supply lines through Turkish lands to Europe, as Putin-Erdogan have opened the Turkish Stream Gas Line which transforms the Russian gas through Turkey to Bulgaria, Greece, Macedonia and later to the European countries.
Beside the economic projects, the file of arms' deals is the same as the missile defense system S-400, and Russia's building of the first Turkish nuclear reactor in Akoyo constitute a lever for circulating the Russian-Turkish disputes despite the strategic contradiction between the two countries.
In fact, the visit of both Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu and Hulusi Akar to Moscow a few days after Putin-Erdogan summit expresses the controversy over the contradictory issues, how to manage them, and subject the prevention of their eruption to the policy of deals and compromises towards the U.S., without turning into a fixed alliance relationship.