North-Press Agency
Khorshid Delli
With the advancement of the Syrian government forces along with the Russian support in Idlib Governorate, the attention is turning to the battle of Idlib and its outcome, as the field developments raise many questions on the future of the Russian-Turkish understandings. Could we witness new understandings between the two sides? Does what took place and is taking place, within the framework of abandoning the courses of Astana and Sochi? What is the fate of the Turkish observation posts?
So, what about the fate of the armed opposition groups? Where are Erdogan's pledges about protecting these groups? How will all of the mentioned above affect the Russian-Turkish relations? What is the impact of the developments in Idlib on the rest of northern Syria, which is under the control of the "Turkish occupation?”
Could there be a big deal between the Caesar Putin and the Sultan Erdogan?
These and other questions confirm that Idlib has become a test of all of the previous understandings which took place between Russia, Turkey and Iran, and at the same time, it is a path for the Russian-Turkish relations in the upcoming stage.
With the control of the Syrian army over the strategic city of Maarat al-Numan in southern Idlib, which was the first defense line for the armed opposition groups, Erdogan came out to say (his country told the Russian side that its patience is running out, and Turkey will do what it must do if the military campaign doesn't stop, and that Russia has not adhered to Sochi and Astana understandings).
In fact, these Erdogan's statements express the crisis of the Turkish policy in Syria and its hypocrisy, as Turkey, which has repeatedly pledged to protect the armed opposition groups in Idlib, seemed to be watching, if it isn't able to do anything with the progress of the Syrian army, which led some armed opposition groups to accuse Turkey of abandoning and betraying them, as the prevailing belief among them is that Erdogan has sold them in a new deal whose details aren't known yet.
In fact, the Turkish position carries with it the features of a Russian-Turkish deal, which was talked about during the last meeting in Astana, it is an understanding that exists to arrange the control of the Syrian army over the International roads in northwestern Syria, i.e. the M5 highway which connects Aleppo with Damascus, Daraa and Jordan, and the M4 highway which connects the far eastern Syrian borders to Aleppo and then to Latakia, i.e. all the international roads for the vital business, which means the necessity of controlling Saraqib after Marat al-Numan, so that the Russian and the Syrian sides can take full control over these roads. Such a target may face great difficulties, due to the existing of the Turkish observation posts south of Saraqib on the one hand, and on the other hand, because the road reaching to Saraqib via Jabal al-Zawiya may cost a lot, perhaps this explains the focus of the Syrian army on the western and southern axis of the countryside of Aleppo, i.e. the pursuit to link the countryside of Aleppo and Idlib as one battle in order to reach to Saraqib.
The second stage of this Russian-Turkish understanding plan includes the return of the Syrian government institutions to Idlib and the arrangement of the status of the city again, which means getting rid of the armed opposition groups and their influence gradually through settlements which have become known.
What does the aforementioned mean?
A careful reading of the content of these points puts us in front of a number of fundamental issues, perhaps the most prominent of which are:
1- The course of Astana and Sochi understandings was temporary and an expression of the ordering of the priorities of the two sides, in light of the interests of each side in a phased manner and not an expression of achieving a truce which achieves a political settlement in the way of a political solution to the Syrian crisis.
2- The core of the Russian-Turkish understandings was based on the principle of deals, which are deals that achieve some political goals for each side, whether these goals are linked to the Syrian crisis or other files, especially the attitude of the relationship with the United States and its military presence in the East of Euphrates.
3- Unmasking the truth of Erdogan's falsehood in raising moral, humanitarian and religious slogans, as well as his use of Syrian and non-Syrian armed groups as mercenaries in his wars to achieve his agenda, and at the same time his willingness to sell these armed groups in any deal that would achieve these goals and agendas for him.
4- The previous point raises the question about the fate of the armed opposition groups in Idlib and where will their next destination be? How will it be got rid of? Many reports make it clear that some of these groups will be used in the Libyan conflict, while the fate or the destination of a large part of these people aren't known until now.
5- In the principle of the deals, we shouldn't exclude the existence of a new Russian-Turkish deal, according to which Idlib is in exchange for new areas in the East of Euphrates, and the fact that the Turkish-backed armed groups in northern Aleppo (Euphrates Shield and Olive Branch) and in northeastern Syria (Peace Spring) have not moved yet to help the militants in Idlib, indicates the existence of a decision in this regard by the Turkish ruler, and the recent reinforcement of the armed opposition groups in Tal Abyad suggests such a deal, especially in light of the focus of these armed groups and the Turkish media on the city of Kobani.
6- The field situation in Idlib has become a path for the declared Syrian-Turkish dialogue which started with the meeting of Mamlouk-Fidan in Moscow, which means that the path of the return of the official relations between the two sides is linked to Erdogan's abandonment of Idlib.
7- The post-Idlib stage is the stage of restoring other areas occupied by Turkey, specifically the area from Jarablus to Afrin passing through al-Bab and Azaz. Perhaps the main title of this stage will be the activation of Adana Agreement signed between Damascus and Ankara back in 1998, with the difference that Russia is the sponsor of the reactivation of this agreement, even in a new formula which Turkey wants in its favor.
Between the Caesar and the Sultan, there are many paths in Syria, paths which began with Turkey's shooting down of the Russian warplane on the Syrian-Turkish borders, an accident rather than an entry point for a war between the two sides which drew a new era in a relationship that was based on a wide range of historical conflicts. The Caesar succeeded in pushing the Sultan towards his Syrian agenda in the hope of writing a full Russian success story in Syria, and separating Turkey from its historical ally, the West and the NATO, while the Sultan was approaching the Caesar to send important messages to the West firstly, and to support the illusions of re-establishing his old ancestral empire secondly.
Because of this, the man was involved in making death, all terrorist swamps and killing the Kurds, who inflicted the greatest defeat to ISIS, as the Sultan found himself drowned in wars and can never find anyone before him except the firefighter Putin, as the latter knows how to make new successes in his rising political glory from Erdogan's fires.
After Idlib, is the game over, or does Putin know how to push Erdogan to play new roles in the battle of the conflict on the East of Euphrates?