Khorshid Dalli
Despite the Russian-Turkish agreement regarding Idlib, Turkey continues to mobilize its military forces there, constantly sending more troops, weapons and military equipment to the region via the Kafr-Losin crossing, and it establishes new military posts supported by heavy weapons, although the mission of these posts, according to the Sochi Agreement, is limited to observation. The number of Turkish military posts in Idlib increased to more than 50, despite the agreement specifying only 12 posts. Perhaps the continuation of the Turkish military mobilization in this way led observers to ask about the reasons behind this and the goals that Turkey is planning regarding the future of Idlib and the future of the truce with Russia.
In an attempt to answer these questions, we can talk about three basic scenarios, which are:
The first scenario: This is preparation for a new military confrontation. This scenario stems from the fact that the truce in Idlib is fragile, and was seen from the beginning as temporary. With the absence of trust between conflicting parties and a contradiction of their strategies, a new round of fighting is looming, according to most observers.
Therefore, there are those who see the Turkish military mobilization as falling within the framework of preparation for this new round of confrontation, especially since Russia stresses the need to continue to fight Turkish-backed armed terrorist groups, amid accusations that these groups undermine the truce and prevent joint Russian-Turkish patrols from carrying out their duties on both sides of the M4 highway between Aleppo and Latakia.
The second scenario: The isolation of Idlib. This scenario stems from Turkey's investment in the continuation of the truce to strengthen its military presence in Idlib, particularly in the border areas and Idlib city, by creating new military, economic, social, security and cultural realities on the ground in order to separate what has remained of Idlib from Syria. Perhaps what Turkey is working towards in order to achieve this goal is to establish a safe zone under the pretext of protecting IDPs, and such cause may have the support of some European countries, especially Germany. This is a scenario Turkey wants to apply in other areas of northern Syria, specifically the areas that it occupied following its three violent operations: "Euphrates Shield", "Olive Branch" and "Peace Spring". This scenario is very similar to what took place in during the Turkish invasion of northern Cyprus in 1974.
Turkey has been occupying northern Cyprus from that time until now after it announced the establishment of the Republic of North Cyprus, which is recognized only by Turkey.
The third Scenario: The elimination of the terrorist groups.
This scenario stems from the fact that Turkey would not dare to engage in a military confrontation with Russia; that is to say that Russia will not tolerate any Turkish military action on the ground. Accordingly, there are those who believe that the path of Russian-Turkish cooperation will continue in Idlib, and that the practical meaning of this cooperation in the future will be a joint action against terrorist groups, led by the Guardians of Religion terror group. It has been said that the security apparatus in the two countries have recently exchanged information about the terror group, and such a matter came mainly in the truce agreement when Russia succeeded in making Turkey pledge to liberate the territories along the M4 highway between Aleppo and Latakia from the armed groups. Until this cooperation turns into a joint mechanism, Turkey will strengthen its military mobilization in Idlib with the aim of finishing off these groups in the future. They will also attempt to get the Russians to commit to limiting Iranian militias' influence in Idlib and the Aleppo countryside, particularly in the town of Saraqeb, which may increase the importance of cooperation between Turkey and Russia in northwestern Syria.
Russia, which controls the rhythm between the conflicting parties in Idlib, seems closer to the last scenario. It wants to continue cooperation with Turkey, not only to get rid of armed terror groups in Idlib, but also to restore the relationship between Ankara and Damascus by returning to the Adana agreement, even in a modified form, to fix the border situation between the two countries. This Russian desire may not be easily fulfilled for three reasons:
First, Turkish ambitions in North and East Syria, and its constant endeavor to define the political future of Syria through its affiliated armed groups, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood, within the framework of its regional agenda.
Second, Iran tends to enhance its influence on the ground in the face of the Russian-Turkish agreement's repercussions against its role in Syria. Iran feels that the agreement, which was reached without it, targets in one way or another its role and influence in Syria, and it strengthens its military presence there. Therefore, in preparation for a new tour of fighting in favorable conditions, this could create new regional alignments with the Syrian crisis.
Third, The U.S. stance, which seems closer to the rejection of the Russian-Turkish agreement. Perhaps this explains the U.S. rejection of Moscow's attempt to push the U.N. Security Council to ratify the agreement in order to make it international, and perhaps the U.S. rejection of the agreement stems from its regional path on the US-Turkish relations and the strengthening of the Russian influence more than the achievement of stability in Idlib.
In fact, regardless of the previous scenarios and their regional and international implications, it is difficult to believe that the goal of the Turkish military mobilization is merely to eliminate the armed and terrorist groups, especially since these groups are associated with and managed by them. It is likely that Turkey's goal has to do with the existence of Turkish plans to stay long-term in Syria under various pretexts and excuses, taking advantage of the Russian understanding of this agenda on the basis of the higher interests that bind the two countries.