QAMISHLI, Syria’s (North Press) – In Turkish-controlled north Aleppo, military alliances can have the shelf life of bread. Throughout the past two years, the kaleidoscope of factions that make up the Syrian National Army (SNA) have restructured and re-restructured into new formations dozens of times as warlords compete for greater influence. When a new coalition – the Shahba Gathering – announced itself on February 2, 2023, it thus raised few eyebrows outside of the region. Its member militias were mostly not heavy-hitters; it controlled only a few strategic locations. However, in the northern countryside of Aleppo, the move was perceived as an affront and denounced. This is because the Shahba Gathering is largely seen as a cog in Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s (HTS) plan to snatch away the region from Turkish tutelage.
What is the Shahba Gathering?
The Shahba Gathering was established on February 2. ‘Shahba’ is the name for a historical region of northern Aleppo. Indeed, its member militias are mostly locals. At that time, the Gathering consisted of coalition between three groups: Ahrar al-Sham (Eastern Sector), Ahrar al-Tawhid (Brigade 50), and Nour al-Din al-Zenki Movement.
Days later, they were joined by the Azaz Falcons Brigade (Liwa Suqour Azaz), a new group formed by defectors from the Northern Storm Brigade (Liwa Asifat al-Shamal). With the exception of Ahrar al-Sham (Eastern Sector), all other constituting members had split off from the Levant Front (al-Jabha al-Shamiya), a large SNA faction which controls the Azaz and al-Bab regions. The al-Fatah Brigade, itself a faction within Ahrar al-Tawhid (Brigade 50), quickly withdrew from the coalition – along with others groups from Ahrar al-Tawhid and Nour al-Din al-Zenki – due to Turkish pressure. The Fatah Brigade was formed by a member of the religious Shura council of the SNA’s Third Corps, a larger coalition which is dominated by the Levant Front. Ahrar al-Sham (Eastern Sector) had previously been a part of the Third Corps as well, before defecting in April of 2022.
According to a source quoted by Enab Baladi, a news website, the Shahba Gathering boasts over some 7,000 fighters – not enough to compete with the largest SNA factions, but nothing to sneeze at, either. On the day after its formation, the ministry of defense of the Syrian Interim Government (SIG), the political arm of the SNA, released a statement denouncing the Gathering and saying that it was not an SNA group. The Shahba Gathering quickly added that it aimed to unite opposition factions, stressing that it would defend the “goals of the revolution” in the face of a coming Turkish-Syrian rapprochement.
This is because, besides geography and ties to the Third Corps, the Shahba Gathering militants had one other important common denominator: cozy relations with HTS (formerly al-Nusra Front), a jihadist outfit controlling Idlib, and a sworn enemy of the Levant Front. In this light, their formation was a clear provocation. Violent clashes between Shahba Gathering members and other actors thus followed quickly. What explains this move?
A short history of the Shahba Gathering
Before the Gathering: the Hamran crossing and Ahrar al-Sham
Since early 2022, HTS has attempted to extend its power into Turkish-controlled areas of Afrin and north of Aleppo (also known as the ‘Euphrates Shield’ area). As Syrians for Truth and Justice reported, it offered SNA factions the possibility of carrying on under the HTS umbrella. Some SNA factions – such as Sultan Suleiman Shah and the Hamza Division – have been receptive to that idea. The Levant Front rejected the proposal.
The HTS first intervened in Afrin physically after the aforementioned defection of Ahrar al-Sham (Eastern Sector) from the Third Corps, dispatching fighters to counter Levant Front attacks in June 2022. Unlike other SNA factions, the Levant Front has a concrete ideological outlook and internal political structure. This has put them at odds with their Turkish overlords and HTS, both of which prefer malleable criminal enterprises to groups with a fully-fledged socio-political projects for the region.
In October, the HTS again took significant territory in Afrin and north of Aleppo as it intervened in clashes between the Levant Front and Hamza Division. The Front was almost entirely expelled from the Afrin region. During the campaign, Ahrar al-Sham (Eastern Sector) also dislodged Levant Front from the frontlines to the west of Manbij and the Hamran crossing, a profitable transit corridor for oil and other goods from Autonomous Administration-controlled (AANES) northeast Syria. According to SyriaTV, an opposition news site, the crossing nets between $5-7 million per month. Since late 2022, this income has gone into the coffers of Ahrar al-Sham (Eastern Sector) and the HTS, that jointly administer Hamran. It became even more profitable after the February 6 earthquake, when it was used by the AANES to deliver large quantities of aid, much of which was reportedly syphoned off by the factions.
The SNA’s loss of control over the crossing led to wider conflict almost immediately. The SIG demanded it be transferred to their jurisdiction and the earnings be split between all SNA factions, though not HTS. In January, Saddam al-Musa (also known as ‘Abu Uday’), a commander within Ahrar al-Sham (Eastern Sector), was killed by a drone strike in al-Hadath, north of al-Bab. His faction and HTS pointed their fingers at Turkey. Allegedly, al-Musa had overseen the Hamran crossing and refused to hand control over to a civilian administration. According to Ahrar al-Sham (Eastern Sector) and HTS, he was killed for his intransigence. On March 3, Hamran was briefly handed over to the SIG, before the decision was revoked on the 9th.
Ahrar al-Sham (Eastern Sector) is the sister faction of Ahrar al-Sham, the latter of which has more consistently worked with HTS. The Eastern Sector defected from the Third Corps under the leadership of Hassan Soufan, a close friend of Abu Muhammad al-Jolani, the undisputed leader of HTS. Yet the Eastern Sector itself is split between anti-HTS and pro-HTS factions, the latter of which is also known as ‘Ahrar Awlan’ for the location of their headquarters, north of al-Bab. The fact that the Shahba Gathering is clearly an HTS-directed group (as will be elucidated below) could further fracture the Eastern Sector. Its militiamen in Awlan, al-Hadath and Hamran identify with the Shahba Gathering. Groups in Susyan, Abla, Tel Battal and Jarablus have yet to position themselves.
Into the fire: Ahrar al-Tawhid and a series of assassinations
Ahrar al-Tawhid is the spiritual successor of Liwa al-Tawhid, a Tel Rifaat-based group that was ousted by Kurdish YPG forces in 2016, later joining the Levant Front. Ahrar al-Tawhid was born in December 2022 as union between a number of smaller militias splitting off from the Front. Its founding document names the al-Fatah Brigade (further explained below), al-Qawa 55, First Central, Free 322 Brigade, 5th Battalion, Brigade 343, and the Sultan Othman Brigade as members. It initially claimed neutrality. A post on their Twitter account on March 17 shows al-Tawhid militiamen mobilizing in Azaz to create a buffer between Ahrar al-Sham and the Levant Front. Despite the rhetoric, their membership in the Shahba Gathering is a clear sign of their alignment with HTS against the Levant Front.
At least two al-Tawhid members have been assassinated in the group’s young history. On March 14, Commander Mustafa al-Raslani was killed by an IED planted on his car in the town of Shamarikh, north of Azaz. On April 13, Commander Ali Hamdo Barbouri was killed in Qatmeh, east of Afrin. According to Afrin Post, Ahrar al-Tawhid, the SNA’s Second Corps (which has ties to HTS), and Turkish intelligence concocted a version of events whereby Barbouri was accidentally shot by a Second Corps militiamen. In reality, the local news site says, he was deliberately assassinated by an SNA group, which they do not specify. No conclusive evidence tying Levant Front to the crimes exists, but both Shamarikh and Qatmeh are within the Front’s sphere of influence. Moreover, Barbouri’s brother had been killed at a Levant Front checkpoint a week prior.
Ahrar al-Tawhid’s ties to the HTS are undeniable: the two groups’ precursors cooperated under a single operations room in Tel Rifaat; Hussein al-Assaf (or ‘Hajji Tel Rifaat’) has a close relationship with al-Jolani, going so far as to meet the HTS leader during their invasion of Afrin in 2022 – that is, before Ahrar al-Tawhid’s defection from the Levant Front. Due to Turkish threats, at least three of Ahrar al-Tawhid’s constituent militias have reportedly left the Shahba Gathering. Among them: the al-Fatah Brigade.