In the spider’s web
Chief of the Syrian intelligence, Ali Mamlouk, has occupied leadership positions in the country’s complex national security apparatus since 2005. He is a close of confidant of al-Assad and part of the Baathist old guard. As intelligence chief, he has been handed a number of high-profile responsibilities, including rapprochement with foreign governments, internal reconciliation, and the so-called ‘Kurdish file’. French intelligence once painted Mamlouk as “the most powerful man of the Assad regime,” but a more recent Middle East Institute report describes him as “unimpressive and powerless.” By all accounts, domestic and international rapprochement has made limited progress under his helm. He has built a good rapport with Syria’s Kurds. Nonetheless, after over a decade of negotiations, both sides have little to show for it.
The fact that, starting in September 2019, al-Assad began re-designating some of Mamlouk’s responsibilities should be of note. Mamlouk is not being ousted – not yet, anyway. According to one account, he is slotted to become Vice-President. Others say he retains his position, however stripped of some important ‘files’. In January 2023, he was still meeting an AANES delegation in Damascus. However, it seems clear that his most high-profile roles are being re-assigned. More important still is the recipient of these responsibilities: Hossam Louqa.
Hossam Louqa is an outlier among Syria’s governing class: he is of Sunni Circassian heritage, growing up in a modest village in Syria’s interior. At 60, Louqa is somewhat of a young hotshot within the geriatric leadership of the Baath party. Yet his apt networking and social climbing have made him stand out. According to a profile by the Middle East Institute, “[Louqa’s] ruthless, smooth-talking nature has netted him powerful allies from Aleppo to Latakia to Damascus, reportedly earning him the nickname ‘the spider’.”
The spymaster began his ascend in 1984, serving in a number of positions within Syria’s different intelligence branches, including a brief stint in Kurdish-majority Afrin. Louqa made his name during the Syrian war, when he was posted as head of Political Security to Homs, a major hotbed of anti-government protests. In 2016, he was promoted to assistant director of the General Intelligence Directorate and put in charge of pacifying the city.
In July of 2016, the Syrian government passed Decree 15, offering amnesty to opposition fighters in return for their surrender and inscription with local security forces. In 2018, a Russian-negotiated agreement handed the opposition in Daraa, southern Syria, limited autonomy in return for halting their insurgency. The agreement prevented the government’s security forces from establishing themselves in the region and allowed locals to retain some light weapons. The pacification initiative failed, however, and within a year the government and Russia cracked down on dissent in the region. Louqa, who at the time was posted to Daraa, oversaw a new reconciliation initiative. However, one which was a lot more suffocating than the Russian version and imposed full government control over the region.
Shortly afterward, Louqa was tasked with opening similar reconciliation centers around the country. In 2021, a center was opened in Deir ez-Zor in order to entice tribal leaders on the SDF-controlled side of the region to surrender. A similar center was inaugurated in the Raqqa region in 2022. As a Sunni Muslim and gifted speaker, Louqa has been able to address tribal leaders and opposition figures in ways the Alawite-dominated old guard never could.
Since late 2019, Louqa has also picked up efforts for rapprochement with foreign leaders. One of his first achievements was to organize a phone call between al-Assad and Jordan’s king, Abdullah II, in October 2021. In recent months, al-Assad has made major strides in rapprochement with Middle Eastern leaders. Louqa is also set to oversee negotiations with the AANES. Government insiders say he lacks the well-established relationship to the Kurds of his predecessor. However, his negotiation style is also more dynamic. Louqa is likely to offer significant concession in order to find a definite settlement in the northeast. As a significantly more pro-Russian figure than Mamlouk, he is likely to push for the US to exit Syria.
A look into the crystal ball
What does all this mean for Syria? Turkey’s May 14 election will be a significant factor shaping Syria’s future. Should the moderate opposition be elected, it will likely seek to rid itself both of its support for Islamist militias in Syria, as well as the Syrian refugees within its borders. The SNA in particular will almost certainly crumble without Turkish backing. The Turkish opposition’s dependence on Kurdish votes may also bring some respite for the AANES. Nevertheless, the AANES is also living on borrowed time. It is beset by embargoes on three sides; the US forces currently preventing the worst may be gone within the next few years. Yet Damascus also knows that it cannot dislodge the SDF or HTS merely by force.
A lot, then, rides on Louqa’s ability to provide a viable roadmap that includes all parties. No doubt, ‘the Spider’ is a breadth of fresh air to the stale negotiations the government has conducted with opposition groups throughout the past decade. However, a closer look at his track record reveals few reasons to be optimistic.
Louqa’s reconciliation initiatives have provided few long-lasting successes. His flagship project – Daraa – is continually beset by insecurity. Last year, ISIS made a comeback in the region, flying their black standard over a checkpoint and conducting a number of attacks. Drug smuggling is rampant. Since Russian forces in south Syria relocated to Ukraine, Iranian-backed militias have filled the vacuum, adding to the chaos. Part of the problem is the fact that government forces have continued to arrest and assassinated former opposition figures despite the existing amnesty. Those who surrendered and joined the government’s security forces have been thrust onto the frontline with HTS, near Idlib, or into anti-ISIS operations in the Badia desert.
The reconciliation centers aiming to attract SDF deserters in the north-eastern Arab regions have met few successes. Most residents of Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor eye the AANES with suspicion, but much prefer it over the central government. Deir ez-Zor in particular is home to many escapees from the eastern banks, where Iranian militias reign supreme. Speaking on the topic of reconciliation centers, a clan leader from SDF-controlled Tabqa made reference to Daraa to argue against them, saying that such “settlements are a scheme through which [Syrian] intelligence tries to spread sedition and propaganda to undermine coexistence. However … they have never succeeded.” He added that “reconciliation is a type of stabilization model on the cheap, because it does not commit Damascus to any significant reforms in how it governs while also withholding any promises of money for local development.”
Stability and reform are not the goal, argues Syria.TV, a Turkey-based pro-opposition news site. “The regime does not care about the extent of the popular turnout for these settlements, because its goal is good publicity domestically, and, externally, to show that it controls the land and is its legitimate owner,” it says. “[The Syrian government] also appears victorious in its war, and able to grant amnesty to its opponents.” Having witnessed previous failures, the Turkish-backed opposition and the AANES will not fall for similar promises of amnesty without an accompanying fundamental change to how Syria is run.
2023 could be a significant year for the future of Syria. After 12 years of war, it could herald an actual political settlement. For this to happen, the government in Damascus needs to dispel any notion of a ‘total victory’ over all of its opponents. Rapprochement with foreign leaders was the easiest of Louqa’s ‘files’ – after a decade of war, most regional heads of state want to return to some semblance of normalcy. The various groups in opposition to al-Assad do not have that luxury. For them, opposing the Syrian president is a matter of life and death. A lasting solution will take more than smooth talking and broken promises.