How Western governments responding to rapprochement with Assad?
QAMISHLI, Syria (North Press) – This week, Turkey is scheduled to hold the highest-level meeting with Syrian government officials since 2011. Last week, Saudi Arabia extended an invitation to the government of Bashar al-Assad to re-take its seat at the Arab League over a decade since it was expelled. Ankara and Riyadh once bankrolled Syrian factions dead-set on Assad’s fall; both are now ready to resume ties with the same dictator. What effects has this volte-face had on the Middle East?
[PART III]
The good, the bad and the ugly – Syria’s rapprochement beyond the Middle East
Russia, Iran and China
Syria’s recent attention in the region and the moves towards rapprochement have been called a “victory lap” for Russia and Iran by al-Monitor. This is somewhat true. Russia and Iran have stuck out 12 years of fighting, leaving a country destroyed and isolated, but increasingly Middle Eastern states are coming to terms with the fact that al-Assad is here to stay. Russia has long lobbied Gulf states to invest in Syria. Moscow and Beijing have also served as important peace brokers in the Middle East in the past few weeks. Yet the success is not shared equally by the three countries.
North Press previously wrote about the likely futures of China and Russia in the Middle East. China is likely to increase its mercantilist ties with some Middle East nations; it may even invest in Syria’s reconstruction if the returns are worth it. Beijing’s ‘growth without values’ approach may also be enticing for a number of the region’s autocrats. However, China is unlikely to increase its military presence in the Middle East. While it has drawn attention to itself by brokering a Saudi-Iranian peace last month, it is no replacement for the role currently played by regional actors, such as the US, Russia, Turkey or Iran.
Russia has scored a number of high-profile diplomatic achievements in recent months. It is brokering the Turkish-Syrian rapprochement, as well as having negotiated Saudi talks with Damascus. Al-Assad’s survival is a major win for Moscow, but it is likely to be the only one. Russian foreign policy is deeply unpopular with nearly all Middle Easterners but a handful of autocrats; Russia’s economy has little to offer the region. And its invasion of Ukraine has only worsened its international standing.
Similarly, Iran seems to have achieved its goals in Syria, controlling large swathes of Syria’s east and south, and enjoying over a Tehran-to-Beirut land corridor. However, the Iranian presence in Syria is deeply unpopular. This is true for the population of Deir ez-Zor – which Iranian-backed militias run as their personal fiefdom – but also among some government officials, as Iran’s presence hampers Syria’s re-integration into the international community and has led to near-daily bombings by Israel.
Even Russia, Tehran’s main partner in backing al-Assad, has attempted to sideline Iran. The recent meeting between Syrian and Turkish officials in Moscow initially included UAE as the fourth party, before Tehran protested and pushed Damascus to cancel the talks in mid-March. The UAE was then switched out for Iran. For now, Russia is dependent on Iranian drone shipments for its war in Ukraine. However, in the long run, Syria’s rapprochement with other governments will threaten the Iranian hold over the country.
Israel and the West
Two countries have been vehemently against any rapprochement with al-Assad: the United States and Israel. Washington has made several remarks discouraging normalization for its allies in the region. Since 2020, it has imposed a series of crippling sanctions on Syria through the Caesar Act, which goes well beyond punishing state officials, by targeting any foreign actor involved in Syria’s reconstruction. The US also funded and trained anti-government militias in Syria before turning to the Syrian Democratic Forces to fight ISIS in the northeast.
For its support for Hezbollah, the US has classified Syria a ‘state sponsor of terrorism’ since 1979 – it is the only country to have been on the list since it was created. The US’ main geopolitical goal in Syria is not the fall of al-Assad itself, but to stem the influence of Russia and especially Iran in the country. While the growing acceptance of al-Assad back into the fold of Middle East politics may appear to be a stunning policy failure for Washington, observers have argued that it could present an opportunity to pry Syria away from Iran. Syrian government insiders have long argued that Iran has overstayed its welcome in Syria; closer relations with the Gulf and its neighbours could hand Damascus the necessary impetus to wind down Iran’s take-over of the country. As Washington is unlikely to be on speaking terms with al-Assad any time soon, Arab states could also act as intermediaries and diplomatic backroom channels.
Washington has so far not changed its own stance towards al-Assad, but this is likely a consequence of a lack of a coherent Syria policy in general. In recent weeks, however, it has soften its position on its Middle Eastern partners’ growing relationship with Damascus. Barbara Leaf, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, reportedly said that “if you’re going to engage with the regime, get something for that” last month, signalling its openness to rapprochement under the right conditions.
Israel, on the other hand, does not have the luxury of being able to ignore Syria. Like Washington, Tel Aviv does not protest the al-Assad government as such – it much prefers it to an Islamist take-over of Syria – but instead perceives Iran’s presence in Syria as a threat.
Until quite recently, Israel seemed to have achieved the impossible: despite no solution to the Palestinian question and ongoing human rights abuses, it was well on the way towards normalizing ties with a number of Arab states, such as the UAE, Oman, Sudan, Morocco, and even Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia’s peace with Iran and the growing voices for rapprochement with al-Assad have sidetracked that process. Moreover, as Israel has elected its most right-wing government ever and ramped-up violence against Palestinians, the country finds itself isolated among its Middle East peers.
Tel Aviv has lashed out with a barrage of rockets against Iranian targets in Syria this year – four times this week alone. On Sunday, Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant said that his country will “push Iran and Hezbollah out of Syria.” Yet such attacks will only provoke Iran.
Conclusion
Al-Assad’s return to the international community has been attributed to its shrewd use of the devastating February 2023 earthquake to its advantage. Countries dead-set against al-Assad suddenly delivered aid worth millions; even the US was forced to temporarily suspend its sanctions. The natural disaster provided an opportunity, but many Middle Eastern states – including Western partners – were well on the way towards rapprochement before 2023.
The reasons for the volte-face are manifold: incessant Russian diplomacy, Washington’s failure to form a coherent policy towards Syria, growing economic interdependency in the Middle East and a desire to end decade-long conflicts, the lack of any palatable opposition to al-Assad, a desire to stem the source of regional insecurity caused by an unstable Syria, and a widespread fatigue with the Syrian conflict.
How far Syria’s normalization efforts will go is yet to be seen. No doubt, Syria will remain unstable and divided despite al-Assad’s growing acceptance. Normalization will mean a major shift in the international policy towards Syria, but it does not get the country any closer to resolving its internal conflicts.