How Middle East governments responding to rapprochement with Assad
QAMISHLI, Syria (North Press) – This week, Turkey is scheduled to hold the highest-level meeting with Syrian government officials since 2011. Last week, Saudi Arabia extended an invitation to the Syrian government to re-take its seat at the Arab League over a decade since it was expelled. Ankara and Riyadh once bankrolled Syrian factions dead-set on Assad’s fall; both are now ready to resume ties with the same dictator. What effects has this volte-face had on the Middle East?
[PART I]
Policy Review – the Gulf
Saudi Arabia
The news which broke on Sunday, April 2, were surprising. Saudi Arabia was calling for the Syrian government to re-take its seat at the Arab League. The move was anything but obvious. The government in Riyadh had hinted that it would be open to it in the future, but said it was “too early” only last month. Now, it was inviting the Damascus representative to a League summit in its capital in May.
The schizophrenic approach towards Bashar al-Assad is nothing new. In the early years of the civil war, millions of dollars flowed from Saudi Arabia to jihadist opposition groups in Syria. In December 2021, the Saudi ambassador to the UN had openly vilified rapprochement with al-Assad saying, “don’t believe them if their leader stands on a pyramid of innocent people claiming a great victory; how can he declare victory from amongst the remains of innocent people and the ruins of people’s houses.”
In May of the same year, however, Saudi Arabia had initiated contact with the Syrian government through a meeting between the two countries’ intelligence chiefs. The meeting reportedly laid the groundwork for reopening the Saudi embassy in Damascus. The fruits of that diplomatic process are likely to come into effect after the holy month of Ramadan, when the two countries say they will resume consular services.
The talks between both parties seem to be brokered by Russia. According to the Wall Street Journal (WSJ), Saudi and Syrian officials want to conclude a deal before a visit by the Saudi Foreign Minister, Faisal bin Farhan, to Damascus in late April. The main focus of the talks relates to security issues, such as the fate of Saudi citizens captured in Syria as part of jihadist groups and cooperation in cutting off funding to such groups.
Observers say that one of Saudi Arabia’s main goals through rapprochement is to lure al-Assad away from Iran. The Saudis can hardly protest al-Assad’s decade of bloodshed given its own track record; both governments also share a deep anxiety over Islamists in their country. Riyadh does not want to target Syria itself, but al-Assad’s backer, Iran. It could do so by offering generous funds for rebuilding necessary Syrian infrastructure, which 12 years of war have left in tatters. However, it is unclear to what extent Riyadh is willing to violate US-imposed sanctions to do so.
For Saudi Arabia’s ruling family, rapprochement with al-Assad also constitutes an important part of its new diplomatic approach for the region. Throughout the 2010s, Riyadh backed violent factions in Syria and Yemen, brutally crushed pro-democracy protests in Bahrain, increased tensions with Iran to an all-time high, laid siege to Qatar, and flew in a murder crew to Istanbul to kill a famous Saudi journalist. Such aggressions are no longer in fashion.
Today, the focus is on growth, economic diversification, and stability to encourage investment. In 2021, Saudi Arabia lifted its blockade of Qatar. Its Crown Prince, Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud, visited Ankara last year. Until recently, it was well on the way to opening itself up to Israel, also a long-time foe. Two weeks ago, a Chinese-brokered deal eased tensions with Iran. Saudi Arabia is likely to exit the Yemen war in exchange for security assurances from Tehran.
Saudi Arabia is also shifting from a Western gaze to a more global vision. It has used the two major agreements reached in the past few weeks to improve its relationship with Russia and China. On March 29, the Saudi cabinet approved a decision that would have the kingdom join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, a Chinese-led counter-weight to NATO. Saudi Arabia is not necessarily divesting from the West, but it is diversifying.
The United Arab Emirates (UAE)
The UAE’s effort to normalize ties with Syria has been ahead of Saudi policy for some time. Abu Dhabi called for the ousting of al-Assad and supported Syrian opposition groups during the early years of the war, but was among the first states to resume relations with the embattled government. In 2018, the UAE re-established full diplomatic relations with Damascus. Since then, the Syrian president has been a guest in the UAE twice. In 2021, the UAE called for Syria to return to the Arab League.
The UAE made a big show of its support to the country after two deadly earthquakes in February 2023. It pledged more than $100 million in assistance to Syria – by far the largest sum by any single nation – dispatched search and rescue teams, provided thousands of tons of emergency relief items, and offered medical treatment for Syrian quake victims in its hospitals.
The UAE’s policy is “part of a deeper vision and a broader approach aimed at strengthening Arab and regional stability,” a senior Emirati presidential adviser tweeted. The rationale is similar to Saudi Arabia’s: stability breeds growth. In the Gulf, the UAE has taken the lead in economic diversification away from oil, as well as exiting unwinnable conflicts, such as the one in Yemen, in part due to the country’s smaller oil reserves and greater reliance on global finance and tourism.
Oman
The Sultanate of Oman has long acted as a neutral broker in the region – so, too, in regards to al-Assad. It was one of the few Arab countries not to break off diplomatic relations with Damascus after 2011. Though it did vote in favor of their expulsion from the Arab League and for the Syrian opposition to take its place, it has since lobbied for al-Assad’s government to re-join the League.
Politicians from the two countries have had high-level meetings since 2015, including the Omani Foreign Minister’s visit to Damascus that year, the Syrian counterpart’s visit to Muscat in 2021, and Bashar al-Assad’s visit to the Omani capital after the earthquake in February 2023. During the visit the Syrian president praised Oman’s “balanced policies.”
Bahrain
Bahrain is highly dependent on Saudi Arabia economically and militarily. It is the only Gulf country with a Shi’a majority, though its ruling family is Sunni. It was also the only Gulf country to experience any significant uprising in 2011 (bar Yemen). For these reasons, its leadership is fearful of (Shi’a) Iranian encroachment in the region.
It is thus surprising that Bahrain has followed the UAE’s lead on rapprochement with Syria, rather than waiting for Riyadh to make the first move. Manama opened an embassy in Damascus at the end of 2018. It has also defended Syria’s “territorial sovereignty.”
A few things explains this: Bahrain is far less rich than its neighbors. It stands to gain geopolitically and economically if it takes an early seat at the diplomatic table, together with the UAE (and Jordan), provided other countries follow their lead. It could also hope to stave off Iranian provocations by easing tensions with Tehran and Damascus. The deeply anti-revolutionary sentiment in Manama stemming from its own experience with Arab Spring protests is also worth considering.
Moreover, observers estimate that Bahrain is not acting wholly independently from Saudi Arabia. Instead, it is likely Riyadh gave an early green light to Bahrain’s leadership in order to test the waters before it conducted its own rapprochement diplomacy.
Kuwait
For years, Kuwait has followed a policy of ‘multilateralism’ by remaining non-aligned in most conflicts. Its leadership also places much weight on supra-national diplomatic bodies, such as the Gulf Cooperation Council and the Arab League. In 2014, Kuwait and Syria restored diplomatic ties at a chargés d’affaires level. In 2019, its relationship partially thawed. However, Kuwait has resisted normalizing bilateral relations fully, waiting instead for the Arab League to take the initiative.
Kuwait is the Gulf’s only ‘semi-democracy’, meaning that it has a parliament as well as a monarch. This has led to a partial misalignment between the country’s politicians and the ruling royal family. Unlike the neutral rulers, Kuwait’s parliament is littered with Muslim Brotherhood members and Salafists. It was also the only Gulf country not to criminalize terrorist financing. This has lead single politicians to side against the government in condemning al-Assad. Kuwaiti charities have also provided generous funding for Arab settlement projects in the Turkish-occupied regions of Afrin, a formerly Kurdish-majority area in northern Syria.
Qatar
Only one state in the Gulf has rejected normalizing ties with al-Assad outright: Qatar. In late 2022, its foreign minister stated that “his country’s position regarding the Syrian regime’s participation in the next session of the League of Arab States in Algeria has not changed,” noting that “the reasons for which Damascus’ membership was suspended are still valid.”
The Qatari royal family have also criticized the Damascus government over their handling of aid deliveries after the February earthquake, saying it was “abusing aid for political purposes.” In March, Qatar endorsed a peace initiative in Syria proposed by Jordan, a country much further on the path of normalization with Damascus. However, it has yet to make any meaningful commitments. The only meaningful cooperation with Damascus in the last decade has been a scheme to supply Lebanon with Qatari gas, which needed to pass through government-held Syrian territory. The pipeline was opened in late 2021.
Qatar’s leaders are more ideological than their Gulf peers. Doha has been a hub for exiled Islamist leaders for decades. Unlike other Gulf monarchies, it supports the Muslim Brotherhood. On Syria, it is also much more closely aligned with the government of Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Ankara, which has invaded Syria thrice, than any Gulf monarchy. The Qatari state has funded a number of Arab settlements in Turkish-occupied Afrin, including recent ones opened under the guise of earthquake aid. Its future stance on normalization with al-Assad, therefore, is highly dependent on Erdogan’s next steps. Without the any initiative from Ankara, Doha is unlikely to extend the olive branch to al-Assad.