Since the eruption of the current war, the Syrian regime has relied on several armed formations, whose aim was mainly attracting thousands of loyalists from the poor society classes, organizing them into armed formations known initially as Shabiha, state-sponsored militias, to crack down the protests and carry out a campaign of intimidation against the activists and residents.
At the beginning of 2012, the armed formations in Syria started to be more of an organized collective character, as the conflict turned into a more traditional form militarily.
The security intelligence services created many militias that attracted young men who couldn’t either travel abroad or who thought that the survival of the regime served their continuation as a group. This was the same for many of the members of minorities, and in particular the Alawite sect.
These militias, in turn, formed social affiliation with them, with Russian and Iranian support, led or supervised by some of the regime’s symbols, such as Hilal al-Assad, cousin of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, who was killed in 2014, and the businessman Ayman Jabir.
This investigation tells tragic stories of some members of these militias, and reveals how the Syrian regime left the families of those killed to face their fate alone. The families of the dead then became easy prey for officers whose main concern is gaining money and taking bribes.
A job opportunity through weapons
“I was 26 years old then, and I thought joining one of the formations of the auxiliary forces was the best option to stay close to my family and get a good salary, instead of joining the military service and going to a far place, for a salary that is not enough for me,” Ziad so briefly tells his heartbreak story.
When we met Ziad (a pseudonym), who is now 35 years old, he had been wearing the military uniform for about ten years. He said: “At that time the regime spread a rumor that whoever joined the auxiliary forces will be considered to have completed the military or reserve service.”
Although the members of auxiliary forces were not summoned to the compulsory or reserve service, they discovered, after several years, that their names were among those who evaded the compulsory service.
Over the past years, Ziad has witnessed the killing of dozens of comrades-in-arms during the bloody confrontations with the armed opposition forces.
After three years of fighting, the young man had no other choice but to join the Syrian Army after settling his status, “as if I had never carried a weapon”.
Perhaps the story of Ziad represents the general situation of those who joined the auxiliary forces shortly after their creation. With the emergence of these forces, a large number of those who did not join the military service and others, especially retired officers, joined to these forces.
The money incentives offered by these forces were behind joining the young men as well as the retired officers, as the amount of the salaries was about five times the salaries of conscripts in the Syrian Army at the time.
Furthermore, some of those who joined these forces were able to achieve rapid and unreasonable money gains by legalizing what was known as “looting.” The auxiliary forces had the lion’s share when entering any area from which the opposition forces withdrew to seize the houses and their contents.
At that time, everything was stolen, even the electrical wires in the walls.
“Some of them made millions of Syrian pounds during the looting operations. They took everything they could find. The areas we entered after a few days seemed empty of everything, as if they had never been inhabited,” Ziad added.
Exploiting the sectarian card
At first, the auxiliary forces were more of a regional character, as most of them were made up of members of the Alawite sect in the governorates of the Syrian coast.
Meanwhile, Alawite clerics contributed to a large degree in mobilizing young men to join these forces, especially in rural areas.
By wearing a military uniform and carrying a gun instead of the traditional religious dress, the name of Sheikh Muhammad Rida Hatem emerged to give the weapon a certain sanctity.
This sheikh comes from the village of Balloran, north of Latakia. He is an academic who studied Islamic law as well as the Arabic language. He comes from the Hatem family, which has famous religious roots in this region, and is one of the most prominent families in the sheikhdom for the Alawite sect.
Some forces adopted sectarian slogans or symbolic names, especially after the regime’s use of these force as mercenaries became more evident.
Ahmad, 25, who lives in a small village in the countryside of Latakia, tells how he joined the so-called National Defense Forces (NDF) when he was only 17 in 2013.
“The sheikh who taught me the religion encouraged me to fight to defend our existence, and my father had suffered an injury that prevented him from working at that time.”
“I thought that joining the forces would enable me to support my family and defend our existence at the same time. I was also tempted by the salary, which was 50,000 SYP at the time, but what I faced after joining was a real nightmare,” he said.
Between 2012 and 2013, young men were gathered and taken to the village of Istamo in the countryside of Latakia, where Ahmad, along with dozens of young men and retired officers, received some training in a hurry that lasted for only about a week, and they were sent to battles against the opposition forces.
The young man tells his first experience in the war saying: “We felt great panic the moment the battle broke out, which made us flee. I remember that one of the retired officers had a heart attack while escaping because his health didn’t help him participate in the fighting.”
Thousands of casualties
Relatives of those killed in the regular army receive compensation ranging from 800,000 to 3,000,000 SYP, which is decided by the Ministry of Defense, while the ministry considered the deaths of the auxiliary forces as “civilian martyrs” at the beginning.
The wounded of these forces or the families of their dead did not have the same rights that the relatives of the killed soldiers had before the term “Popular Defense Forces” appeared instead of the “auxiliary forces”.
However, all those who were killed or wounded while participating with the auxiliary forces were not included in the new classification.
Officials, who spoke on condition of anonymity, say “the regime gave compensation for the wounded and killed in these forces, in the form of gifts or benefits.”
Since the formation of these forces and their work had nothing to do with legal frameworks or directly related to the state, they did not receive compensation on regularly or through official channels at first.
Rather, these compensations took a (civil) character through “al-Bustan Charitable Association” headed by businessman Rami Makhlouf. The families of the killed and wounded within the auxiliary forces were given sums of no more than 25,000 SYP at intervals.
Another way of compensations was through organizations that are run and supervised by senior figures in the regime, such as the “Martyr Foundation” and “al-Areen Foundation,” which are run by Asma al-Assad, the wife of the Syrian president.
Al-Areen Foundation, which replaced al-Bustan Charitable Society, provides the families of some of the killed members with monthly sums ranging between 30,000 and 45,000 SYP (about 10-15 US dollars), without any criteria determining the value of the amount.
Meanwhile, the Prime Ministry approved a monthly compensation for the wounded members of the “Popular Defense Forces” at a rate of 40 percent or more, with monthly amounts ranging between 80,000 and 120,000 SYP in the event of a total disability for ten years.
Compensation will be granted from the “Wounded for the sake of Homeland” fund. However, these compensations include only a part of the wounded and killed members.
The number of “Popular Defense” dead registered in Latakia governorate alone is about 2,400, while the number of the wounded is about 700 members.
However, local NGOs say that the number exceeds that by hundreds of numbers.
Mr. Tariq (a pseudonym), a man in his sixties we met on his way going to government departments for a possible financial compensation for the death of his son who was within one of those military formations. He was killed while transporting the ammunition, but he wasn’t considered a “martyr”.
It was recorded in the death certificate that the cause was “not due to the military service,” which deprived his family of all the rights granted to the families of the “martyrs.”
“Some people asked me to pay three million Syrian pounds, to register my son on the list of martyrs,” the man said.
Muhammad, 30, a former fighter in the auxiliary forces, said he sustained an injury that led to the amputation of his feet, but his estimated disability rate is 40 percent. When we asked him about the reason, he said: ” This was their assessment of my disability.”
However, he added that one of the officers hinted that I would have to pay a certain amount in case he wanted to obtain the due percentage of the disability.
There is no law that determines the percentages of disability and injury or the amount granted to the injured according to the degree of injury. Rather, the matter is left to the estimation of the officers and employees.
An approach that will increase the suffering
If you cross the countryside of the Syrian coast, you will not pass by a village without seeing a sign at the entrance to each village bearing the names and pictures of young men killed during the battles for the Syrian regime.
Most of them belonged to the poorer classes in the rural areas. The rural people were the main pillar of these formations. They had joined the fight to achieve some quick money gains or because of the sectarian mobilization with the outbreak of popular protests against Assad’s rule.
Suha, who is a pseudonym for a woman in her fifties, tells the story of her son, who suffers from quadriplegia due to a head injury during the fighting in the auxiliary forces: “My son needs medicines and diapers every day, in addition to someone to take care of him all the time.”
“The diapers alone cost more than 200,000 SYP per month, if available.” The mother was forced to have a “disability card” for her son to secure some diapers for free from NGOs every month.
However, diapers are not always available to these associations. Suha frequently visits the government institutions responsible for these associations to meet their request.
“I have no income except for the salary, which in recent months has risen to 120,000 SYP, and I cannot work because I have to take care of my son,” she added.
Government officials who spoke to us said the NGOs tend to reduce the number of beneficiaries of the aid granted by them, which will increase the suffering of families more and more.
Open ends where the weapon masters the situation
The regime has transformed the areas of its supporters, especially the Syrian coast, into residential areas that host military and security positions. The armed manifestations on the street thus have become a regular thing since 2011.
The uncontrolled weapon has led to the consolidation of different forms of violence in daily life, and perhaps the most prominent of these recent incidents in the Syrian street, what happened in the city of Tartus, where three people were killed and 13 others were wounded.
The story began when someone threw a bomb at his brother-in-law after family disputes. Latakia also witnessed the killing of a young man with a gun early last October as a result of personal disputes.
Now, the regime is trying to contain the anger of the wounded and families of the killed members of the auxiliary forces, who felt that they had been dragged into a game from which they got out without any gains, by spreading rumors about its intention to consider them part of the regular army.
However, these rumors completely contradict what government officials have indicated about the tendency of NGOs to reduce the number of beneficiaries of the aid granted by them.
The families of killed people said these rumors are nothing more than a trap that the regime tries to attract people to it again, or it is a desperate attempt to make them live with a false hope.