Recovering Bashar al-Assad with incapacitate terms

The return of refugees is the first condition for a settlement in Syria, a settlement that all influential countries on the Syrian issue aspire to, and that does not take into account any of the desires of the Syrian people, who are drawn to a destiny they did not choose.

But if we only considered this point, we will find that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad is a loser in all cases and in all the currently proposed scenarios.

The United States leaves the reins to Russia in Syria, and it is required to set matters right with the settlement of the Iranian-Saudi conflict, and to convince all concerned countries in the region to accept the returning of currently-torn Syria to al-Assad’s regime. What is required is not only the return of Syria to the Arab League, but its official return to the entire international community arena, after many countries withdrew their ambassadors and repudiated the al-Assad regime for killing its own people.

Thus, apparently, al-Assad appears victorious and confident in his regime, despite its abject failure on all levels internally.

As for the price of this victory, it seems superficially simple, as this calm imposed on everyone means the return of the refugees, in other words, in order for the Turkish deep state (not only Erdogan), Jordan and other Arab and Western countries that were once within the Friends of Syria Group, to accept reconciliation with Bashar al-Assad and close the book on war, al-Assad must announce security measures and a general amnesty, so that everyone can find points of common interests in ending the war.

Refugees have become the title of the Syrian issue, and their return is the first European and Turkish demand, thus al-Assad and Russia know that there is no escape from returning the refugees to Syria and issuing a general amnesty.

But what does the return of every Syrian to his home mean? What does the general amnesty process and the ease of the security grip in Syria mean?

Syrian refugees have created political crises in all asylum countries, and the European Union has divided between those which decided to receive them and settle them, and those which said that a solution for the Syrian crisis must be found. In general, the media discourse did not talk much about the arguments of the countries refused to receive the refugees until the crisis in Turkey grew, when we heard a new similar political discourse in Europe and Turkey that the refugee crisis or the refusal to accept new refugees is not only part of the election programs of extremist parties, but also of the programs of the centrists. In other words, there is no longer any opportunity to present the issue economically or socially from an objective and, even political perspective, as the presence of more than seven million Syrians in the countries of Europe, Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan constitutes crises for these countries, and the process of receiving them was costly for all. The most important thing remains that asylum and displacement continue towards all of these states and cannot be stopped as long as the Syrian regime threatens the lives of the concerned citizens.

Perhaps, this reality will be another motive to end the crisis in a quick way. It is the one who forces the countries that announced their support for the Syrian revolution to reverse their stance and accept Assad’s continuation despite all the crimes they documented against the Syrian people. After al-Assad was the first reason for the displacement, what is required today is only to stop that displacement.

While the few regime’s supporters and loyalists cheer for their soon control over all of Syria, everyone knows deep down that what is to come is the most dangerous.

The terms that will be imposed or already have been imposed seriously on the regime to stay, or on al-Assad to remain, are the easing of the security grip and the announcement of the general amnesty so that everyone can return, but the security grip is the only way that kept the president in power.. What if he is stripped of it?

The second point is perhaps purely economic. In case Syria is disarmed from all sides, it will be ready for reconstruction, and the Syrian regime will have no choice but to completely change its economic monopoly approach to bring in capitals for the reconstruction of the country and create a healthy economic atmosphere suitable for all, reassuring and employing young people whom the war has not enabled them to be qualified scientifically or professionally.

Currently, the infrastructure is broken, and there are crises that paralyze all sectors. Electricity, water, medicine, and education must be secured. For this reason, any government, whatever it is, can no longer leave corruption and the rule of outlaws, slums, and lawlessness governs the country as is the case.

During the last ten years, the regime was forced to play with war profiteers and leave much for brutality, looting and corruption in order not to lose its loyalists. Today, one of the terms for survival is combating corruption, reforming all sectors, and imposing valid laws so that capitals can trust to return to Syria to invest and operate the crippled country, without opening the private investment sector on an international level and with internationally approved laws, especially within the framework of an upcoming comprehensive project for the balance and stability of the Eastern Mediterranean. In other words, whoever is in power in Syria, he will be obliged to pursue serious economic competition policies away from any monopoly and randomness.

But easing the security grip while fighting corruption will pose a great danger to the regime, in addition to the fact that social issues related to internally national reconciliation have not been seriously raised.

The returnees will return with their hatred, and the silenced will find that the atmosphere is suitable for speaking and rebellion. As for those the regime empowered them to stay with it and bought their loyalty, they will be discontented because they will refuse to stop their thefts that have been legalized for them and will refuse to reduce their illegal resources. This is in addition to the Kurdish issue in Syria, the issue of the constitution, and many other outstanding ones. 

Therefore, after recovering al-Assad with these incapacitate terms, which it seems that Russia can only obligate al-Assad and Iran to implement them, how will he govern the country?

Is there a serious hope for stability in Syria?