The recent events in Qamishli seemed to need another form of approach, far from the whims of political parties and their haste to invent descriptions; that is, far from borrowing easy approaches such as considering what happened as ”sedition” or ”conspiracy” or similar labels that lack proper analysis, that is the accuracy of distinction between armed clashes and civil war ”sedition” is necessary in light of the chaos that governs the logic of many Syrians, not to mention that any analysis of a rapid event should not be connected to the historical event, or the one that is dependent on previous historical events.
Originally, the National Defence militia was formed shortly after the security presence of those loyal to the Syrian regime in Hasakah governorate decreased. This militia has not recorded any instances of defense in the region, neither in confronting ISIS nor in resisting pro-Turkish armed groups. Consequently, the function of this militia was limited to existing in specific neighborhoods within the cities of Hasakah and Qamishli.
According to German sociologist, historian, jurist, and political economist, Max Weber, the principle of “the monopoly of violence,” or the exclusive right to use power, is the best way to establish the presence of an individual armed security power which has the right to use violence to confront criminals, fight terrorism, and ensure safety. This right usually belongs to the state, but the Syrian state withdrew, delayed fulfilling its role, and was not objective to the citizens. On the contrary, it became a part of the killing, and torture without carrying out its duties to face internal threats such as the development of war, defense of borders, and maintenance of its sovereignty. As result, the regime voluntarily abandoned the principle of the monopoly of violence, where it formed and contributed to the emergence of militias outside of its armed forces and brought others from outside Syria.
Some of the monopoly of violence was achieved by the Autonomous Administration in North and East Syria (AANES), which, since the proliferation of armed groups in Syria, stood against the multiplicity of armed forces in the regions it administers and expanded the ethnic composition of its forces. The multi-ethnic formation of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) or the Internal Security Forces (Asayish) led to the expulsion of seditious actors and the possibility of any security or military action becoming a national project aimed at the dominance of one ethnic community over other partners.
However, what sparked the ire during the recent days, which witnessed clashes resulting in the defeat of the dissolved National Defense militia, was the haste in considering the event “strife.”
Strife means confrontation that took or will take an ethnic turn, which contradicts the nature of the two fighting powers in Qamishli; the National Defence was not a representative of any civil group, rather it was a local force within the pro-government militia, whereas the Asayish constituted the backbone of the security apparatus in towns, villages and cities of northeast Syria. Moreover, the number of non-Kurds included in its ranks is high, which makes the occurrence of ethnic strife elusive. Adding to that, the strife may mean that the two forces were previously in one position, where all the facts confirm that both forces were opposed and had previously clashed in a different position, as the two forces had never been in a state of harmony or coexistence in one front.
Assumptions may be made that the National Defense was enjoying Iranian support, and that the regime lost ability to secure this power. What legitimizes this assumption is the Russians’ rapid approval to dissolve this force and accept the AANES’s condition to end any presence of the National Defense in al-Tai neighborhood.
The security operation that took place in al-Tai neighborhood was not directed at a tribe or a community gathering in a multiethnic and multicultural city. The operation was not connected to a recent past as some would explain it according to a narrative different to reality – that what happened is nothing but a “punishment” for the Kurdish uprising in 2004; the path of events does not indicate a desire for revenge or punishment of those involved in the suppression of the uprising. So far, no tracing or accountability has occurred for those involved in those events since the AANES was established.
In summary, after this quick security operation, the AANES has fortified one of its weak properties, and thus Qamishli becomes in parallel with two forces instead of the multiplicity of forces, the more influential force representing the Autonomous Administration and the other represented by the presence of the regime, which has an almost purely symbolic, limited sphere of influence. Perhaps the task awaiting the AANES in the meantime lies in the AANES’ efforts to include al-Tai neighbouhood in its administrative and security apparatus, to meet the residents’ needs, and free them from their fears related to the defeat and dissolution of the National Defense.
What happened in al-Tai neighborhood was not a Kurdish-Arab war, and this is not what has been assumed, nor a conflict between the Kurds and the regime in the broad sense of the word, or a declaration of a war on a tribe. The matter can be explained in a clearer and simpler way; two forces cannot coexist in a narrow space. One wants to transform its neighborhood into a closed camp that follows special laws, and another seeks to establish a viable and sustainable administrative model, and accordingly, clashes would have occurred under the same conditions and causes in any other city or neighborhood, whether it bears a Kurdish or Arabic name.