Shoresh Darwish
Lebanon used to be an arena of Arab and regional conflict. Arab competition for roles and influence became more evidently clear during the Lebanese Civil War. Lebanon’s weakness and humiliation was covered by a magical slogan, “Lebanon’s strength lies in its weakness,” while the social and civil fabric was steadily disintegrating. The intervention left thousands of victims, a state of sectarianism, and a fragile internal peace. As for the parties that opened the doors or left them open for foreign interference, they could no longer close them. The situation was, the strength of Lebanon lies in its unity and in its rejection of the interventions of the “brotherhood.” As for the slogans praising Lebanon’s weakness, they were the bandages that hid a deep wound.
In the meantime, the conditions of Syria’s Kurds are similar to the ones of the Lebanese, the difference being that the competition and conflict are on the level of all Kurdish parties outside Syria. Of course, this conflict finds its individual thumbnail in the differences of the parties and in their alliances, as most of the parties take the source of their existence and legitimacy from other Kurdish forces. The matter may make the Syrian Kurdish regions a backyard for settling scores, and a loose ground to impose attendance by various means.
The historical split of the Syrian Kurdish parties has given way to two main issues, the doubling of the Kurdistani (from the Kurdistan Region of Iraq) intervention, and the failure to allow the emergence of a party with a well-established and balanced popular base, thus giving birth to a parallel leadership of the Kurdistani leaders in terms of symbolic presence, influence, and power. These two issues have led the Syria’s Kurds to borrow the Kurdistani figures. Therefore, those who borrow figures need to grant them their political and organizational decisions.
The past ten years have strengthened the Kurdistani presence in Qamishli. The absence of a Syrian patriotism that is able to absorb the Kurdish issue and the fear of both the opposition and the regime’s rhetoric has contributed to the adherence of the Syria’s Kurds to the Kurdistani parties and bullying them in an exaggerated manner.
In parallel with the “gains” the Syria’s Kurds achieved, they have lost a lot. Counting the losses is not an easy process. We see the Turkish occupations of Afrin, Sere Kaniye (Ras al-Ain), and Tel Abyad, and the deep wound that was left behind like the displacement of half a million Kurds. At the same time, no end of the Turkish aggression and the existential threats associated with the expansionist fascist ideology and policies of disciplining the Kurds can be seen. Russia and the regime grab the opportunity to inherit the SDF through the Turkish-Russian tug-of-war game. The Kurdish agreement is disrupted and subordinated to the Kurdistani conflicts in some way, while the dialogue is suspended on the peg of the will of the US, not the Kurds, at a time that the US has become distanced itself from providing such “services” to those who do not want it. The Kurdish presence in opposition forums is formal and without any value (you can read the constitutional principles paper presented by the coalition and its partners, where it did not mention the rights of the Kurds). Issues of governance, combating corruption, and providing services in the areas of the Autonomous Administration do not concern political parties, as the attention is focused on sharing power and not on strengthening the Autonomous Administration and making it an administration that transcends the partisan situation.
The pessimism imposed by the facts on the Kurdish arena is matched by the military and security success achieved by the SDF and Internal Security Forces (Asayish), as ISIS was defeated militarily. But on the other hand, it still poses a great danger through its sleeper cells. ISIS terrified the world with its cruelty, violence, and methods of governing local communities. In addition, balanced policies prevented the possibility of ethnic conflict taking place between Kurds and Arabs, which is what the regime, Turkey and the Coalition relied on to destroy the Autonomous Administration and drag it into the arena of Syrian civil conflicts.
The fragility of the political/partisan reality imposes avoiding the Syria’s Kurds the potential effects of the Kurdistani conflicts, as in the case of the recent escalation between the KDP and the PKK, the accompanying mutual accusations on social media between the masses of the two parties, and the subsequent related events such as the attacks on the headquarters of ENKS and the offices of its parties, in addition to the repeated statements of Erbil officials against the PKK by Syria’s Kurds, and considering some of Syria’s Kurds as involved in the protest movement in Iraqi Kurdistan region.
Despite the severity of the current Syrian Kurdish polarization, the SDF can maintain the internal Kurdish peace and keep supporting the Syrian intra-Kurdish dialogue in light of the temporary absence of the US. The most important thing is for the SDF to be able to avoid the Kurdistani conflicts and disagreements, because involving the SDF in the Kurdistani differences mean weakening it. So, the solution is for the SDF to close the door through which the Kurdistani disputes are snuck into Syria.
Contrary to the party rules, there is a silent majority represented by the grassroots figures that support the Syrian intra-Kurdish dialogue and support the administration. These individuals seem biased towards the policy of self-distancing, and they refuse to engage in Kurdistani conflicts. They define themselves as a Syrian Kurdish group, despite the strong Kurdistani attractions and the depth of nationalist sentiments. This imagined majority will stand by rational policies, regardless of their source, even though they do not have the means of shouting and “squawking,” such as those available to some other parties, and they do not have their own media.
The Kurds of Syria can only be Syria’s Kurds according to the rule of mutual respect with the other parts of Kurdistan. This issue has its cost, but it is less costly than engaging in a loose Kurdistani space full of existing and anticipated conflicts. Even if the realization of such a vision seems somewhat dreamy, given the complexities of the Kurdish reality, it remains easier than the policies of bullying and loyalty.
Syria’s Kurds cannot borrow the deceptive Lebanese slogan and alter it to become “Syrian Kurds’ strength lies in their weakness,” nor can they go on and engage in the Kurdistani partisan wars, and thus become, according to Hobbes, part of the “war of all against all.” Syria’s Kurds should learn something from the neighborhood’s bitter experiences. Perhaps the Lebanese experience motivates us to take the lessons and look a little further.