It is early to talk about a significant change in the Turkish policy towards north and east Syria and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) with the arrival of Joe Biden to the US presidency.
In addition to the outrageous violations committed by the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) such as obstructing the democratic path and turning Turkey into an authoritarian state that clamps down the opposition, dismisses the parliament members and municipalities’ heads-elect, in addition to holding mock trials and put the opposition members in prisons.
This developing American refusal for the internal and external Turkish policies represents the cornerstone for the project of the Turkish government to change its manner despite Ankara’s expected intransigence, bluntness, and media escalation.
The pragmatism that distinguished the policy of the ruling party since it came to power will be surfaced again despite the dogmatism that became the most outstanding feature if not the only, in the composition of the party.
It is no doubt that the era of the former US president, Donald Trump, represented the climax stage of the feverish Turkish policy that sought to create regional and international tensions.
In fact, giving Erdogan free hand in this way misled Erdogan himself who hurried to obtain the largest amount of new areas of influence which caused regional and international tensions, signing agreements and deals with America’s opponents such as Russia and its enemies such as Iran.
Giving Turkey free hand in this way has turned into a curse for the ruling party which may hurry to mitigate these hasty policies.
Perhaps, the Turkish policies in north and east Syria is one of the direct tests for the possibility to make a change in Turkey’s hardline attitudes, or to make a disclaimer which Erdogan’s policy is known with during crises.
Syria’s Kurds sought for grooming Turkey before and after occupying Afrin and Sere Kaniye (Ras al-Ain), but to no vail, as Turkish intransigence and continuation on the path of escalation and threat remained the most prominent feature.
In exchange for peace rhetoric despite the calamities that the Syria’s Kurds afflicted and adopting the policy of “opening doors”, Turkey kept a nihilist policy that depended on war without thinking about investing in peace and benefit the cultural and social ties between the two sides of the border, and what Syria’s Kurds can form as a bridge for convergence between two neighboring countries.
In addition to what the peace can bring as developed, cultural and political benefits in both sides of the border, and the possibility of easing tension between Washington and Ankara regarding north and east Syria’s issue.
In both cases in which Turkey expected ending the role of Syria’s Kurds and their balanced presence within the SDF as a Kurdish and Syrian developing force, the Turkish bet failed to achieve a general collapse, which confirmed that the issue of erasing the Kurdish presence or ending the presence of the SDF is more complicated than a major occupation here or a demographic change there.
Rather, the Autonomous Administration was, in the midst of the war, paying the salaries of its administrative staff while the SDF was facing ISIS or its sleeper or awake cells.
Regarding the war and occupation rhetoric, the path to peace process requires the combination of several factors, such as the United States preventing the repetition of the Turkish aggression and insisting on that, and not showing the laxity shown by the Trump administration.
Especially since the threat of economic sanctions stopped the course of the Turkish war which was subject to development during the occupation of Sere Kaniye and Tel Abyad, in addition to the serious anger shown by the US Congress and its impact on the Turkish decision, as the Turkish aggression appeared unexplained in view of the assurances given by the Global Coalition forces and the SDF, especially the issue of removing the latter’s fighters from the border strip.
Walking on the path of peace also requires a Kurdistan role that contributes to the confidence-building process. We remember the pivotal role that the late Jalal Talabani played between the late Turkish president Turgut Ozal and Abdullah Ocalan, and what the matter represented at that time from a serious beginning to think about peace and the reversal of war policy. It is true that the circumstances and the characters are different, but the idea remains the same.
The most important thing is that the explicit signals that the SDF sends, despite the tragedies caused by Turkey to the Kurds of Syria and the Syrians east of the Euphrates, may receive a listening ear if the United States seeks to support the peace process and control Turkey’s behavior. The paradox is that the side that incurred thousands of victims who lost their lives, homes and properties as a result of the hostile Turkish policies, they were the initiators of peace, while the aggressor side seeks war and settling issues with widespread devastation.
There is a slight chance to achieve peace, but nevertheless we are talking about an opportunity in which the US presence in the region contributes in the possible changes, and Turkey’s loss of the futility that it has acquired over the past few years. If we do not meet serious objections to the issue of establishing peace in the Syrian Kurdish region, the situation appears to be more difficult in Turkey and its government that seeks for wars more than walking in the path of peace, even if it is a tactical peace.
The most complex problem lies in whether the ruling Turkish party considers that peace is one of the signs of its end!