Meghan Bodette
On November 3, the United States will choose its next president. Polls currently show Democratic nominee Joe Biden in the lead, and a serious possibility of the Democratic Party taking control of the Senate from the Republican Party, which now holds the majority.
If this outcome holds, a Biden administration and a Democratic-led Congress would have unique opportunities to change course on Turkey, Syria, and Kurdish issues.
Personnel appointments are one way in which the next administration could make this change. Today, Turkey policy usually falls to individuals and departments whose work is focused on Europe, Eurasia, and NATO, while Syria policy is the purview of individuals and departments focused on the Middle East and counterterrorism. This creates an artificial disconnect in the US policy response to Kurdish issues—where developments on one side of the Syrian-Turkish border are usually reflected on the other.
A whole-of-government approach is necessary instead. A Biden administration should appoint individuals to posts related to Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria that have some background in Kurdish issues, and establish some kind of coordination to ensure that relevant developments in these countries are looked at through the lens of “Kurdish policy.” This would help correct several false assumptions that have threatened regional stability and security—like the belief that Turkish intervention in Syria could be warded off through a stop-gap ‘safe zone’ without a domestic political reckoning.
The administration could also engage more openly with Kurdish political actors. This would be a break from both Democratic and Republican tradition. As Vice President, Biden expressed contradictory views on Turkey, Kurds, and the Syrian conflict, and the Obama administration reacted to Erdogan’s abandonment of the peace process and subsequent crackdown on the domestic opposition as much as Trump did to attacks on Afrin, Sere Kaniye and Tel Abyad.
Today, however, the calculation is different: Americans associate appeasement of Turkey with Trump’s disastrous foreign policy, and the demands of Kurdish political actors align with the goals of an administration seeking a foreign policy based on democracy and peace rather than personal sympathy for autocrats.
To change course in Syria, they could support the inclusion of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria in UN negotiations, a step Obama and Trump both failed to take. They could also provide the region with complete sanctions relief as part of a broader reckoning with the devastating foreign sanctions the current administration has imposed.
Strengthening the AANES through diplomatic engagement while pushing for political resolution in Turkey will help create conditions for the US to lessen its military presence in Syria and ultimately withdraw without sparking a new invasion.
A new administration should also be more open about diplomatic engagement with Turkey’s pro-Kurdish opposition. Biden has stated himself that he would be willing to do this— another difference from his tenure as Vice President, where the Obama administration imposed no consequences on Erdogan as the democratic opening caused by peace talks was crushed in favor of arrests of opposition MPs and mayors.
Congress can also use this issue to take back some of its power on foreign policy as a co-equal branch of government. The Kurdish question is an exemplary area for Congress to put forward a blueprint for Middle East policy that puts human rights and diplomacy first, reevaluates failing alliances, and works to end endless wars—goals that many of their constituents increasingly share.
To do this, they could cut the security aid to Turkey included in yearly defense budgets, formalize the de facto ban on arms transfers that members of both parties have already enforced, and take steps to move American troops—and nuclear weapons—out of the country. This would withdraw American support from Erdogan’s destabilizing military adventures, and make it clear to Turkey that their political relationship with the United States had changed.
These measures would free up funding for proactive efforts to address existing challenges in North and East Syria—like a restoration of the reconstruction funding cut by the Trump administration, or increased support for IDPs and victims of UN-documented human rights abuses in areas that Trump allowed Turkey to invade and occupy.
Congress could also put forward legislation showing what the United States could envision as the necessary conditions for restoring the relationship: improved human rights outcomes, democratization, and a peaceful settlement to the conflict with Kurdish groups both within and outside of Turkey’s borders.
Much of the blueprint for action here already exists. Turkey’s recent aggression against Kurds, Armenians, Greeks, and others has led to the introduction of many bills calling for a review of security assistance and military cooperation, as well as condemnations of the country’s human rights abuses. In the 1990s, when Turkey enjoyed a much better relationship with the United States than it does now, members of Congress called for an end to its occupation of Kurdish territories in neighboring states and demanded a peaceful resolution to the Kurdish conflict.
The next administration will have many challenges to address—and will need to reset both relationships and broader ways of interacting with the world. If it chooses to pursue a policy based on peace, democracy, and restraint, using diplomatic and economic tools to engage with Kurdish political actors and promote peace and pluralism in Turkey and Syria would be a strong first step.