Little was leaked from the surprise visit of United States Special Representative for Syria Engagement James Jeffrey to Syria, although foreseeing the reasons for the visit was easy, as the purpose of the visit was to push the two Kurdish blocs (the Kurdish National Unity Parties and the Kurdish National Council in Syria or ENKS) to speed up the conclusion of their agreement, and to show some stability in the face of growing Russian influence east of the Euphrates, especially in Deir ez-Zor.
The Kurdish agreement provides the substantive arguments for the US to contain continued Turkish objections. This reflects the importance of the region and its capabilities in any political settlement in which Washington is present. The most important thing is that the project to contain Iran in Syria and Iraq is going through the Kurdish region and northeastern Syria, and this matter is strongly present in the US strategy despite the emphasis of US rhetoric on the task of tracking down ISIS sleeper cells and ending their presence, or the fear of the possibility of ISIS renewal in the absence of the Global Coalition.
Observers go so far as to say that the American insistence on a political settlement between the Kurdish National Unity Parties and ENKS is due to the fact that if Trump loses in the US elections, he may make – in the short period before the handover of power – a “retaliatory” decision to withdraw from Syria to undermine the vision of American strategists in Congress and the Pentagon, as they aspire to remain in Syria and Iraq and seek to double the number of the US forces on the ground, especially since the idea of confronting Iran appears to be Joe Biden and his Democratic team’s project in the Middle East. Thus, achieving the Kurdish agreement – which the United States did not take even the slightest interest in in earlier phases – an urgent US mission to maintain a foothold in a region full of opponents in the event that the US president decides to withdraw, reduce the number of the forces, or grant Ankara the right to annex additional border areas.
The current focus is on reaching a completed agreement without going into details, so Washington is pushing to delay discussion of controversial issues and small details to later phases, but the Kurdish parties are fond of the details that may be discussed after the completion of the political agreement, such as the issue of curricula and education.
The Democratic Union Party (PYD) showed a lot of flexibility over the course of the negotiations in exchange for demands by the opposite side stressing the details, such as the issue of the PYD’s relationship with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), although the political role of the Syrian Kurds calls for a form of balance: not antagonizing Turkey and not antagonizing the PKK. These two issues should not fall into the orbit of the Syrian intra-Kurdish dialogue, and in addition to this, the United States is responsible for determining the relationship between Syrian Kurds and the PKK. Of course, the PYD can debate in the same trend and ask the ENKS to determine its own position on Turkey, the Syrian opposition coalition and the Muslim Brotherhood. Such matters may bring the dialogue to a standstill, if not end them entirely. Perhaps the United States’ awareness of the sensitivity of these issues prompted the US State Department Envoy to the Eastern Euphrates, Zahra Bailey, to request the postponement of the issue of the PYD’s relationship with the PKK to a later phase.
Returning to what was leaked from the meeting of the Kurdish parties with Jeffrey, the Kurdish parties asked the US to provide assurances that Turkey would not carry out any hostile actions. Despite the close relationship between Jeffrey and Ankara’s politicians, Jeffrey insisted that Washington would prevent any Turkish intervention, and gave the Kurdish parties a faint glimmer of hope.
Among the issues transferred to a later phase was the presence of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor. Although this issue gives the Syrian Kurds preference in any political settlement, the ENKS calls for reducing the area run by the SDF, which is no longer a majority-Kurdish force, given the nature of its national and transnational formation. Perhaps this issue in particular will not get the attention of the US, and in the event that the ENKS insists on this issue at a later phase, the northeastern region of Syria may be subject to two administrations: Area A, which is the Kurdish-majority areas that will be run between the two Kurdish parties with the participation of Arabs, Syriacs, and Assyrians, and Area B, which is run by the SDF and its local partners in Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor, but the two areas will remain allied with Washington by necessity.
In order to speed up the process, Kurds must have a wider horizon by engaging the parties outside the framework of the negotiating parties, especially the Kurdish Progressive Democratic Party and the Kurdish Democratic Unity Party, which has become an emotional issue more than a political one, as how can a political or a national unified position exclude other parties?
The complementary phase is no less important than the Kurdish unified position, that is the phase of the Kurdish-Arab-Syriac dialogue in northeastern Syria, and then the evolution to the phase of self-confidence to establish a Syrian democratic pole that is far from what the Syrian Kurds are intended to be partners for an “opposition” where its democratic and struggling background is questionable.
Washington’s acceleration of the intra-Kurdish dialogue is its matter and interest, but the matter and the interests of the Syrian Kurds require speeding up the process to reach the formula for a final agreement, bypassing the logic of quotas and fabricating excuses and justifications.