With US presidential elections approaching in less than two months, both major political parties have criticized each other extensively on questions of foreign policy. Yet neither party appears to have a comprehensive Syria strategy— and both have a concerning track record of vague objectives and blunt-force tactics.
Trump administration officials have claimed that American goals in Syria include the enduring defeat of ISIS, an end to Iranian presence and influence in the country, and a peaceful resolution to the conflict based on UN Security Council Resolution 2254. Yet the current trajectory of the conflict and choices made by US officials have made all of these objectives nearly unworkable.
Though ISIS lost its last bit of territory in March 2019, the group remains active— and American appeasement of Turkey has directly threatened efforts to wipe it out for good. Several members of the terror group, including former ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, have been targeted in Turkish-occupied areas, raising the question of why they were able to operate there at all. The Turkish invasion of Sere Kaniye and Tel Abyad in October 2019 was followed by an increase in ISIS attacks, as the SDF was forced to divert its efforts away from stabilizing newly-liberated areas in order to defend the border.
In regards to Iran, American policy has done little but increase tensions in the region and harm vulnerable civilians. Iran is geographically close to Syria and is an ally of its government. Politics and simple geography make it more committed to the outcome of the Syrian war than another outside power likely ever would be. Treating Syria as an extension of the administration’s “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran, as certain Trump officials have done, has led the US to underestimate the negative impact of other regional states while pursuing dangerous military escalation.
The UN Security Council Resolution 2254 process has been flawed from the beginning. It does not include the Syrian Democratic Forces or Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria — excluding both one-third of Syrian territory and the country’s second-largest armed force. The Constitutional Committee set up by the resolution has made minimal progress, and includes political representatives from extremist groups that are actively detrimental to peace and stability on the ground. The United States has largely overlooked these deficiencies.
One new policy that has gone into effect alongside these broader goals is the implementation of harsh Caesar Act sanctions. Proponents claim that the sanctions are intended to prevent the Syrian government from committing further atrocities against civilians. In reality, they have compounded an economic crisis that has made it difficult for Syrian families to put food on the table amidst a global pandemic.
Analysts and policymakers alike have sought to deflect blame for civilian harm caused by this economic deprivation, suggesting that this failed course will not be reversed any time soon. The sanctions seem to satisfy a need for the United States to appear as though it has taken low-cost action—regardless of what the impacts of that action may be.
It is clear that the Trump administration’s Syria policy has not always been effective or coherent. Yet a potential Biden administration could repeat some of the same failures. Biden has promised to “recommit to standing with civil society and pro-democracy partners on the ground” and to “press all actors to pursue political solutions, protect vulnerable Syrians, facilitate the work of non-governmental organizations, and help mobilize other countries to support Syria’s reconstruction,” among other vague goals.
None of these proposals suggest clearly defined new policies. The broad rhetoric about democracy and civil society suggests a pattern of support for the UN peace process and the mainstream opposition similar to the current US view.
Several Biden advisors and Democratic-leaning experts want the United States to take a harder line against the Syrian government, and have a history of supporting rebel groups with violent jihadist tendencies. Democrats are just as supportive of strict sanctions on Syria as Republicans are, and have not put forward alternatives that could hold perpetrators of war crimes accountable without harming civilians.
If a new administration takes power in January 2021— or current officials choose seek a second-term policy reset— they will have to begin by taking a more realistic view of the conflict, and seeking to ensure that diplomatic negotiations line up with conditions on the ground. Instead of wielding sanctions and threats to advance unachievable goals, they could commit to a peaceful solution by supporting the individuals and institutions on the ground who have credibly shown that they can create one.