Beirut -North-Press Agency
Khorshid Delli
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan doesn’t
stop threatening that unless the security mechanism is according Turkey’s
terms, his country will resort to implementing its own plans to establish this zone
on its own. Moreover, Erdogan stepped up his discourse towards the U.S.
administration by setting a deadline until the end of this month to establish
this zone according to Turkish terms, otherwise Turkey would launch a military
operation in northeastern Syria. Between each speech, Erdogan increases his terms
and escalations to the point that he suggests abandoning the latest agreement,
which was reached with the U.S. administration on the 7th of last August
to establish this zone.
Turkey’s objectives
In fact, from the moment of signing the
agreement, the priorities of the concerned parties were different. The United
States wanted the establishment of the security mechanism to address the
security concerns on both sides of the borders, and to prevent clashes between
them in light of the constant Turkish threats to repeat the experience of Afrin
against northeastern Syria.
In turn, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)
were cautious for the calmness, removing Turkish justifications, and seeking
for some form of regional and international recognition through this agreement,
while Turkey aims to establish a “security mechanism ” to be under
its control, to achieve a permanent influence in the entire border region of the
north and northeastern of Syria.
Therefore, despite the implementing many steps
of the agreement, such as the establishment of a joint US-Turkish coordination
center, implementing joint air sorties, patrols within the borders, and SDF in
turn, carried out important steps on the ground, such as backfilling the defensive
trenches and fortifications, and withdrawing its forces for a few kilometers
away from the border, but The Turkish side is complaining more, as if its
mouthpiece says that the security mechanism isn’t a solution, and that it will
resort to its own project.
Therefore, the basic question which arises here
is: What does Turkey want from the establishment of the security mechanism?
In fact, the following isn’t a secret of a
follower of the Turkish objectives:
1-
The “security mechanism ” should
be under direct Turkish control:
With the primary objective of eliminating the
experience of the Autonomous Administration and preventing its transformation
into a solid experience at the regional level. This requires, according to the
Turkish concept, the elimination of the military structure of the SDF under the
pretext of combating terrorism, knowing that the SDF is mixed forces
representing various components of northeastern Syrian regions, as they are the
most forces which fought the Islamic State (ISIS) and defeated them with the
support of the Global Coalition.
2-
Resettling
millions of Syrian refugees in Turkey, inside the “security mechanism”:
in order to achieve a group of objectives, first
of which is a demographic change in the region, in addition to getting rid of
the burdens of Syrian refugees, especially after the recent actions taken by
the Turkish government against them.
3-
Transforming
the safe zone into a direct Turkish area of
influence:
Through the formation of local administrations
from its affiliated armed opposition groups, which means eliminating the
experience of the local councils formed in the region with the support of SDF
and the Global Coalition.
What is Turkey based on?
Turkey’s previous aspirations are based on a
number of factors, the most important of which are:
1-
The
prevailing Turkish ideology against the Kurds wherever they are, Turkey believes that the experience of establishing a “security
mechanism ” in northeastern Syria may lead to the gradual recognition of the
Autonomous Administration there, which will increase the difficulties of Turkey
in the absence of any political path to a peaceful solution to the Kurdish
issue inside Turkey, where the former track would demand Turkey’s Kurds for an
Autonomous Administration as an expression of their presence, their will, and
their right to participate in the public life.
2-
The
strategy of drawing the attention of the Turkish internal crisis to the outside, in light of the accumulation of internal Turkish crises,
especially the economy, the disintegration of the ruling Justice and
Development Party (AKP), Erdogan’s sensitivity from the army, and the
obstruction of its policy in Syria, it became clear that Erdogan adopts this
strategy to escape from these crises on one hand, and on the other hand to
engage the army in permanent battles with the outside, for the fear of a new
military coup against him, according to observers of the Turkish affairs.
3-
Paying
attention to the U.S. presence in the north and east of Syria through Iran and
Russia, as the three countries agreed within the framework of Astana Talks to
target this presence, as illegal first, and second in the framework of the conflict
for influence in the Syrian crisis and how to resolve it, where Turkey justifies
that, the U.S. plans secretly to establish a Kurdish state in the region and
the main target of this policy is Turkey, although it is a member in NATO and it
is a historical ally of the United States.
Interferential accounts
Some believe that the Turkish escalation and
the constant threats of a military invasion of north and east of Syria is part
of the Turkish attempts to push the U.S. administration to make the maximum
concessions regarding the security mechanism, especially in terms of depth and
control, and the gradual elimination of the experience of the Autonomous
Administration.
What troubles Ankara the most, is perhaps the attitude
of the U.S. administration, which is adhering to the protection of its local
allies – the SDF – and the continued provision of military support, at a time
Ankara believes that this behavior violates the constants of the US-Turkish
relationship.
In the face of this Turkish dilemma, it is
clear that Erdogan is betting on his own relationship with his U.S. counterpart
Donald Trump, and on offering temptations to the U.S. administration in arms
deals, where a few days ago Erdogan announced that he wanted to buy the American
Patriot missile system, in order to get the most support from Trump during
their upcoming meeting in the upcoming days on the sidelines of the annual
session of the United Nations General Assembly.
In fact, it is clear that Erdogan’s terms for the
“security mechanism” aren’t in the approach of stabilization and
appeasement, but are pushing things into a new chapter of aggravation,
confusion, and openness to open scenarios, which makes a blow to the U.S.
strategy in the region.
The question here is whether the U.S.
administration will change its flexible strategy in dealing with Ankara for
many reasons, or will it continue its policy of rotating the corners with it in
search of possible understandings? With the tumble of an answer to this
question now, all eyes are on the outcome of the upcoming meeting between Trump
and Erdogan.