North-Press Agency
Khorshid Delli
The killing of General Qasem Soleimani by American missile strikes near Baghdad International Airport is the title of a new stage of the U.S. policy towards Iran and its regional policy on the one hand, and the rules of the game of engagement between the two sides on the other hand, because for the first time in the history, Washington is targeting an Iranian symbol at this level, as Soleimani was rightfully the engineer of the Iranian policies in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen and Gaza Strip, and he played the role of the orchestra in leading Iranian-affiliated armed groups in these countries and regions. Perhaps the timing of the killing carried two indicators:
The first, the U.S. president went into the electoral year and he has many threatening problems to his second electoral opportunity. So, he is in need of a qualitative action in order to gain his electoral and political credit in the second phase, and there are those who see that Soleimani's killing has provided him this opportunity to a great extent.
The second, Iran has gone too far in targeting the American interests during the last period, from targeting a U.S. helicopter in Hormuz Strait to striking Aramco oil installations in Saudi Arabia and attacking the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad and besieging it, and there was talks about preparations which were going on to launch significant attacks against U.S. interests in the Middle East. All this made the American side to turn the table upside down on Iran and to set a new equation of confrontation, a confrontation which won't be in Iran's interest if it turns into a direct confrontation, and the latter is different from the wars of arms where Iran is good at. This means that, the Iranian reading to the American attitude wasn't accurate, as it believed that, the U.S. administration won't do any qualitative action against it, as it was in the case of Soleimani's killing. It seems that, this Iranian behavior was due to the severity of its pain because of the U.S. sanctions against it after Washington's cancelling of the Nuclear Truce with Iran, as there are those who see that the Iranian escalation against Washington was aimed at dragging the latter into negotiations of lifting the sanctions.
Responding scenarios and confrontational risks
Undoubtedly, by the killing of Soleimani, Iran was subjected to the maximum strike since the Iranian revolution in 1979, and therefore there is a certainty that Iran will respond to the American strike, especially since the ceiling of the Iranian speech in this regard has reached its maximum level. So what are these scenarios?
The first: Direct bombardment scenario, this scenario is mainly based on launching a missile attack from Iranian territories against U.S. bases and installations in the region. These bases may be in the Arab Gulf countries, Iraq and Syria, but such a response may require a stronger U.S. response, and the reciprocal bombardment will shift to a direct and open confrontation, which would constitute a catastrophe for Iran and the region, especially since Washington has justified its killing of Soleimani as a preventive response.
The second: Proxy attack scenario, especially since Iran has great experience in this type of attacks, as it relies on its arms in the region, as is the case of Hezbollah in Lebanon, Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq and the Houthi Movement in Yemen. This scenario is based on strikes against U.S. interests and its allies in these countries, perhaps such a scenario aims to return to the rules of engagement before the phase of Soleimani’s killing, where this scenario carries the least risks in terms of not turning the limited strikes into a direct and open confrontation, and perhaps the United States itself understands such a scenario if this would achieve the goals of the two sides.
The third: Non-responding scenario, although some exclude this scenario, but it shouldn't be excluded in light of the pragmatism of the Iranian foreign policy and the expected gains from such a scenario for the Iranian leadership. On the one hand, such a scenario may win it international sympathy and put great pressure on the U.S. administration, specifically President Trump, and Iran may bet on Trump's loss in the upcoming elections and looking forward to a new U.S. policy with Iran. On the other hand, such a scenario can be invested in the Iranian interior in terms of showing the injustice to justify the behavior of the regime and to justify the ongoing economic collapse, all of which leads to the consolidation of the regime after it lost much of its credibility and the elements of its speech.
Where is Turkey?
In fact, the killing of the commander of Quds Force, gen. Soleimani isn't just an event that pertains to the U.S.-Iranian relationship only, as his killing would have repercussions on the Iranian presence in a number of the region’s, especially in Syria and Iraq, and this will affect other players, especially Turkey, which has complex relations with Iran, as what appears to be controversial in terms of shape, it seems that they are hostage of common interests, and there is an eagerness to adapt these differences in favor of the understandings. Perhaps Syria was a prominent example of this equation in the relationship between the two sides, where Soleimani and the Turkish intelligence chief Hakan Fidan were the engineers of this policy in Syria.
Indeed, although some may think that Turkey will benefit from Soleimani’s absence in Syria, and that Turkey may seek to benefit from his absence to expand more in Syria, specifically in the countryside of Aleppo, the negative side of this absence may be much greater, Soleimani’s absence may affect the coordination between the two sides, if we know the deals which took place in Syria were often done in accordance with understandings between the two sides in addition to Russia, as Soleimani and Fidan were the engineers who transported militants from different Syrian areas into Idlib, and they were the engineers of Astana agreements with the Russians and the setters of the boundaries' understandings in terms of the Turkish military operations in Syria (Euphrates Shield – Olive Branch – Peace Spring), and the issue goes beyond the Syrian arena to Iraq, specifically the Iraqi Kurdistan Region, as the attitude of the two sides of the referendum conducted by Kurdistan Region on the independence more than two years ago was noticeable, and how both Iran and Turkey pressed to thwart this referendum before Soleimani's role appeared in Kirkuk deal, which was a severe loss for Kurdistan Regional Government.
Accordingly, it can be said that Turkey feels a loss in the killing of Soleimani somewhere, and perhaps Erdogan's description in his message to the Iranian leadership on the occasion of Soleimani’s killing of the latter as a "martyr" confirms this matter before Erdogan retracts from this description. The biggest question is that what would the Turkish position be in the case of the outbreak of a direct confrontation between the U.S. and Iran against the backdrop of Soleimani's killing?
Undoubtedly, the Turkish position is very sensitive, on one hand, it is a historical ally of the United States, and on the other hand, its interests with Iran are great, and therefore it may seek on one hand to show itself as a mediator calling for dialogue between Tehran and Washington and to control the matters so that they don't get out of control, and on the other hand, it shows neutrality in anticipation of the least losses from a possible confrontation. In both cases, Turkey's eyes will continue to be directed to the Iranian policy in Syria after the killing of Soleimani, and how will Soleimani's successor act in the joint files between the two countries in Syria and Iraq?