Khorshid Deli
Syrian Kurds followed with passion and interest the meetings that took place between the Kurdish parties affiliated with the Kurdish National Council (affiliated with the Syrian National Coalition) and the Democratic Union Party (affiliated with the Movement for a Democratic Society/TEV-DEM with American sponsorship, support and encouragement from the Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq, and approval from the Kurdistan Workers Party “PKK”). Many expected that the gathering would hold a press conference at the end of their meetings, announcing the turning of the page of Kurdish division, the formation of a common Kurdish reference for phase management, unification of demands and discourse in facing challenges, and fighting in politics and the field together.
Kurdish division has always been a fatal disease in the Kurdish body, and it has served as a gateway to the enemies of the Kurds in striking their aspirations and eliminating their hopes for which they sacrificed so much. They are still offering up hundreds of martyrs for it. Perhaps what led these people to such a belief is their conviction that the American guarantor, with its influential power, will force Kurdish parties to reconcile in preparation for the stage of settling the Syrian crisis in light of regional and international developments related to this crisis.
Everyone waited for this moment, but none of this happened, and perhaps Kurdish media hastened to publish news of an agreement between the two parties that added to the confusion and complexity, especially since the news that was broadcast about the approval of the Kurdish National Council to withdraw from the Syrian National Coalition (a coalition of Syrian opposition parties) led some of its members to deny the validity of this and make statements that affected the progress of the talks.
This is especially because Turkey, the historical enemy of the Kurds, knew how to take advantage of the incident in the media when they leaked news of an intention to include the Independent Syrian Kurds Association into the Syrian National Coalition instead of the Kurdish National Council, something which tested the Council itself.
Meanwhile, the Democratic Union Party seemed to want the participation of the rest of the parties affiliated with TEV-DEM in the discussions without anyone asking – why did this participation not take place from the beginning?
As well as the participation of the rest of the Kurdish parties outside the Council and the movement, in front of this foggy scene, the questions began from all directions, perhaps the most important of them:
Why was there no formation of a joint committee to provide a daily summary to the media on the progress of the negotiations in order for the Kurdish public to know what is happening? Why wasn't the agenda and items discussed in the meeting room weren’t announced? Why didn’t they announce the points on which they achieved consensus and progress, and the contentious issues that remain pending? These and other questions are still lingering in the minds of the Kurdish citizen, with no good answers.
There are those who see three main reasons behind the failure of the Kurdish parties to reach an agreement so far, namely:
1. The struggle for partisan quotas in government, administration, and incomes. ENKS wants to be equal, on a fifty-fifty basis, in everything, which is not compatible with the vision of TEV-DEM, which is credited with forming existing institutions in the Kurdish regions as well as protecting and managing them over the past years.
2. The role of the Kurdish blocs (Erbil, or KDP and Qandil, or PKK) in influencing Syrian Kurdish parties. It is proven that the two blocks are in competition on the Syrian Kurdish scene from their interests and their own calculations concerning leadership, and not concerning the unity of the Kurds in Syria and the need to have their independent selections in their policy and their relations with the rest the Kurdish parties.
The two parties did not make sufficient efforts to push the Kurdish parties to harmony and unity, and this does not diminish the responsibility of the Syrian Kurdish parties for their inability to be successful in the Kurdish national situation in Syria instead sticking to a narrow partisan view and the dependency on external influences.
3. The Turkish role aimed at thwarting any Kurdish unity efforts, in which the PYD has a place and a role. Perhaps one of the most important files for Turkey in this area is the declaration of membership of ENKS in the Syrian National Coalition, and its weaponization to prevent it from pushing for an independent decision that suits the Syrian Kurdish national interest. On the other hand, there are three factors that ease achieving reconciliation and make it a great national and moral value, which are:
1. The initiative put forward by the commander-in-chief of the Syrian Democratic Forces Mazlum Abdi, which seemed to be non-partisan and an all-inclusive national situation. Abdi’s role has become a safety valve to lead the next phase and achieve what is intended.
2. The U.S. role, which aims to form a unified political bloc that can manage the challenges of this stage, the relationship with Turkey and the regime, and regulate the relationship between political and social components in the East Euphrates region, as this bloc must be ready to settle the Syrian crisis politically.
3. The pressing Kurdish public opinion, as the Kurdish population is tired of the Kurdish partisan differences and it has begun calling for a common Kurdish bloc, as it does not believe that there is any real justification that this has not been achieved. Rather, the public believes that the credibility of these parties depends on achieving that. Otherwise, they will gradually lose their credibility and erode due to the impact of many developments and challenges, especially the Turkish occupation of Afrin, Serekaniye (Ras al-Ain) and Tel Abyad.
In front of this reality, it must be said that whatever the Kurdish differences are, there is no substitute for unity and the formation of a unified bloc, because the division is sufficient to destroy all the accomplishments that have been achieved. The regional agenda is capable of achieving Kurdish national aspirations whenever a step is taken. The regional and international agreements are always made at their expense, as the base of international and regional interests with Turkey is still valid and large, and Turkey will make every effort to achieve its agenda against the Kurds, wherever they are. All the justifications of the Kurdish parties for not proceeding to reach an agreement appear flimsy and stop at partisan interests, not transcendent nationalism.
It must be said that achieving the desired goals must be done through bold and courageous decisions, and provide real will and sincere desire. Therefore, keeping ENKS in the SNC membership, whose policies and agenda are determined by Turkey, does not aid Kurdish national reconciliation.
In fact, it is clear that the most important test for the Kurds is politics through practice. If the frontlines are a battle to preserve existence, then the battle of politics is a battle of identity, establishment, and options. Without this, the political party will remain a threat to existence and not a path to the future.
It is the test in which the Kurdish parties must prove their worth before being omitted by regional developments that historical experiences have always shown to be against the interest of the Kurds due to division, international interests, and power factors that determine the battle of destiny, and the question of the destiny is: Where are you going without consensus, agreement, reference, and unity?