QAMISHLI, Syria (North Press) – One year after Ahmad al-Sharaa assumed leadership of Syria’s transitional government, the relationship between Damascus and the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) remains at a delicate crossroads. While symbolic gestures and landmark agreements have offered glimmers of hope, deep mistrust, unresolved disputes, and intermittent clashes continue to define the political and security landscape in the northeast.
Over the past 12 months, both the transitional government and the AANES have taken unprecedented steps to establish formal channels of dialogue. Yet the most critical commitments—including full ceasefire compliance, freedom of movement between regions, and facilitating the return of displaced Afrin residents—remain largely unfulfilled, highlighting structural obstacles that prevent dialogue from translating into tangible change.
One of the earliest indicators of rapprochement came with the joint adoption of the new Syrian flag in several areas under AANES influence, following consultations between transitional authorities and Kurdish representatives. This move was widely interpreted as a symbolic break from decades of confrontation and a potential step toward normalizing relations.
In February and June, delegations from the AANES and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), including senior military and political leaders, conducted high-level meetings in Damascus—the first of their kind since the transitional government took office. Both sides described the talks as “constructive,” covering decentralization, security coordination, counterterrorism, and the economic needs of the northeast.
The most significant breakthrough occurred on March 10, when Damascus and the AANES signed a roadmap outlining phased cooperation on governance, border security, counterterrorism, natural resource management, and humanitarian access. The agreement set December 31 as the deadline for completing first-stage commitments. While both sides reaffirmed their support, implementation has been slow, reflecting persistent mistrust and divergent priorities.
Despite diplomatic progress, the year has also been marked by tensions on the ground. Frequent ceasefire violations, including clashes at Tishrin Dam between SDF units and factions aligned with the Ministry of Defense, exposed weaknesses in the transitional government’s command over its military components and heightened AANES concerns about Damascus’ reliability.
Restrictions on movement, described by the AANES as a “soft blockade,” continue to impede the transport of goods, medical supplies, and civilians across Deir ez-Zor, Raqqa, Aleppo, and Hasakah. Meanwhile, the politically sensitive issue of returning Afrin’s internally displaced residents remains unresolved. Although the AANES insists the March 10 Agreement includes mechanisms for their safe return, Damascus has deferred the issue, tying it to broader national arrangements and leaving tens of thousands of families in camps or host communities.
Regional powers have closely monitored the evolving dialogue. Turkey, viewing the AANES and SDF as security threats, criticizes engagement, warning that it undermines Syrian territorial unity. Iran has expressed concern that decentralization could weaken Damascus and empower U.S.-aligned actors, while Russia supports the dialogue as a tool to stabilize frontlines and limit U.S. influence, pressing for SDF integration into the Syrian army. Western states, including the United States and European partners, cautiously welcome the talks, emphasizing that effective implementation of the March 10 Agreement could strengthen counter-ISIS efforts and improve humanitarian access.
Analysts point to three main obstacles hindering durable progress: competing visions of decentralization, fragmented pro-government forces that constrain Damascus’ ability to enforce ceasefire commitments, and entrenched mistrust rooted in decades of repression, failed negotiations, and conflicting alliances. The transitional government favors administrative decentralization, whereas the AANES demands political, security, and fiscal autonomy, making compromise difficult.
The December 31 deadline for first-phase implementation has become a critical test. Success could deepen security coordination, ease crossline movement, operationalize joint administrative mechanisms, and lay the groundwork for national dialogue on constitutional reform. Conversely, continued delays may trigger renewed localized clashes, further fragment authority, and erode confidence among regional and international partners.
AANES officials privately warn that ongoing stagnation could embolden hardline actors on both sides, undermining moderates who favor compromise and putting fragile gains at risk.
One year into al-Sharaa’s administration, Kurdish–Damascus relations reflect a complex mix of cautious progress, stalled implementation, and persistent paralysis. While channels of communication have opened, neither side has yet crossed the threshold necessary to translate dialogue into a lasting political settlement. The future of the March 10 Agreement—and the broader political configuration of northeastern Syria—remains uncertain as January approaches.