Manish Rai
Iran began its military intervention in Syria when the civil war broke out in 2011, with the short-term objective of preventing the collapse of the Bashar al-Assad regime. Iranians saw the opportunity in this crisis by creating an Iranian foothold in Syria as a forward base for penetrating the Middle East. To achieve this objective, Iran relies on the usage of the Shia militias under the command of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The militias were brought into Syria on the pretext of assisting the Syrian government, but the real motive is to keep them deployed in Syria for the long term as Tehran’s proxy force. Internally, the civil war has greatly weakened the Syrian army. It lost massive quantities of weapons, and its combat capabilities collapsed. As its troops were depleted because of the massive casualties suffered in addition, large numbers of Syrians either avoided the draft or defected. Also, the soldiers lacked training and the officers were unsure of the soldier’s loyalty. There was an insufficient number of recruits, and throughout the war, not even one of its twenty land divisions ever had a full complement of soldiers or could mobilize more than a third of its combat potential.
The severe shortage of military manpower led the IRGC’s Quds Force to recommend to the Syrian policymakers. That new volunteer armed frameworks based on religious, sectarian, or political affiliation be organized under Quds Force command, composed of local fighters. This resulted in the formation of hundreds of local militias of various sizes and natures which fought alongside the Syrian army as per the requirement. One of the largest and most dominant was the National Defense Force, parallel to the Iranian Basij, an armed upgrade of the Popular Committees formed during the regime of the Baath Party. Iran encouraged the Shia minority in Syria to form special militias. In addition, some of the Shia militias in Syria were and continue to be recruited on a sectarian basis under the pretext of defending places considered holy by the Shia community. For example, campaigns are being conducted in the areas housing holy Shia shrines in Damascus in the Sayyidah Zaynab district. After recruiting individuals, they are sent for about 21 to 45 days of light and medium arms training and sometimes six months for heavy weapons training. These all militias are trained and supervised by the Quds Force directly. Also, the militia salaries are funded from the IRGC budget. The Syrian militias backed or formed by Iran are divided into several groups:
A) Lebanese militias: Hezbollah, the most prominent proxy force of Iran intervened early in the Syrian crisis in May 2011. The Lebanese militant group provided training and technical support to security forces and the Syrian army. Hezbollah has also launched field combat missions since 2013 and always maintains a sizable combat-ready force in Syria.
B) Syrian Shia militias: Iran recruited individuals from the Shia minority in Syria mainly from northern Aleppo, northern Homs, and parts of Raqqa. The Syrian Shia militias have an estimated 5,000 to 8,000 fighters.
C) Iraqi militias: Iraqi Shia militias began to appear in Syria at the end of 2012 after Iran directed them to support the Assad regime. Of note are the Zulfiqar Brigade, Abu al-Fadl Abbas Brigade, Asaad Allah al-Ghalib Brigade, the Imam Ali Brigade, and Asayeb Ahl al-Haq Brigade.
D) Afghan and Pakistani militias: The IRGC recruited Afghan Shia in Iran and Afghanistan and formed the Fatemiyoun Brigade, which began to appear in Syria in November 2012. The Pakistani Shias were also recruited and the Liwa Zainebiyoun was formed which began to appear publicly in Syria in early 2013.
The IRGC and Hezbollah typically train members of these militias in camps in Mashhad, north-eastern Iran, and then transfer them to Syria either by land through Iraq or by air. When they aren’t sent to Iran, the IRGC can rely on several military bases and camps inside Syria, such as Damascus International Airport, T-4 Air Base, Azraa Base, Sayyidah Zaynab Base, al-Kaswa Camp, Zabadani Camp, and al-Qusayr Camp. With the end of the major battles in the Syrian civil war, and as the Bashar al-Assad regime has re-established control over large swathes of Syrian territory, the role of the Iran-backed militia groups has gradually changed. Since the start of Russia’s military invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and as a result of changes in Moscow’s military strategy in Syria, the role of those groups has changed again. Those changes may have serious implications for Syria and the region. With the current political dynamics, Iran’s objective in post-civil war Syria is the projection of power by continued long-term presence in Syria especially to Shia communities across the region. Also, with its permanent presence close to the Israeli northern front, Iran wishes to counterbalance Israel’s power and influence in the region. In addition to this, with the significant presence in Syria, Iran gets the capability to maintain and secure the land corridor. This overland corridor is used to transport weapons from Iran through Iraq to Syria, and from there to Lebanon, bolstering the military build-up of Iranian-backed armed groups.
Tehran intends to leave a significant military presence in Syria for a long time, even once the Assad regime has no considerable threat. Tehran’s strategy is to keep military forces stationed in Syria with commanders and elite units, drawn from the Revolutionary Guards and Quds Force, while the bulk of the fighting forces are drawn from the Shiite militias. By doing this Iran thinks it will be able to make Syria as its permanent satellite state and use it in any way for its geopolitical ambitions.
Author is a columnist for Middle-East and Af-Pak region and Editor of the geo-political news agency ViewsAround can be reached at [email protected]