
By Omar Sharif
SUWAYDA, Syria (North Press) – People have been protesting in Suwayda Governorate, south Syria, for the fourth week in row, as the demonstrators continue to demand “overthrowing Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, changing the corrupt ruling regime, and implementing UNSC Resolution 2254.”
These protests have some important features that set them apart from previous ones in Syria since 2011. They have a significant scope from the beginning, gain momentum over time, and the protesters are highly aware. Moreover, they differ in their approach and organization compared to the protests of 2011 until now.
Another notable development is the change in the principle of the opposition within Daraa, the birthplace of the protests and a region known for its extensive revolutionary experience.
Suwayda has adopted a different approach, focusing on peaceful methods and striving to establish a national leadership for the protests in Daraa, following the example of Sheikh Hakam al-Hajri in Suwayda. However, the question remains: How did the protests begin in Suwayda?
The root causes… outcome of the 12-year-crisis
The hostility between the Syrian government and the people of Jabal al-Druze did not originate from the defection of officer Khaldoun Zeinaddin or his involvement with the armed opposition in 2011, nor from his death during clashes with military security forces in the mountains of Suwayda. Rather, it started with the death of Sheikh Ahmad al-Hajri, the first spiritual leader of the Druze al-Muwahhidun in Syria, in a car accident near the village of Murdok on March 24, 2012.
The people of Suwayda accused the government of planning the incident due to various reasons, one of which was Sheikh al-Hajri’s refusal to distance himself from Khaldoun. Additionally, he refused to retract his defection and repent, fearing a similar fate to that of Major Hussein Harmoush, who was from Idlib.
This incident marked the beginning of the accumulation and the precursor of animosity between “al-Assad and the Druze community”.
However, the second major incident was the bombings in Ain al-Marj and the National Hospital on Sep. 4, 2015, along with the assassination of Sheikh Wahid al-Balous, founder of the Men of Dignity Movement, resulting in dozens of casualties.
The Men of Dignity is a self-defense militia established after the outbreak of the Syrian war to defend the Suwayda area. Described as a terror organization by Russia, it took an initial position against the Syrian government in the early days of the war but did not engage in any armed struggle with government forces.
Evidence indicated that the Military Security Branch, led by Colonel Wafiq Nasser, with alleged support from Sheikh Youssef Jarbou’, was behind the operation. Subsequently, a young man called Wafed Abu Turaba was falsely accused, and his confessions were broadcasted on the Syrian state TV, with claims that they were obtained under torture.
Furthermore, the killing of Shibli Junud, secretary of the local Ba’ath Party branch in Suwayda, and accusing the Men of Dignity for the assassination, and the emergence of the infamous leak of the conversation attributed to Junud speaking to Wafiq Nasser, accusing him of the operations saying, “You killed al-Balous, but why you blew up the hospital,” was considered by the people of Suwayda as a reason for the government’s involvement in his murder.
The major event, however, was the transfer of Islamic State (ISIS) militants from the Yarmouk camp and al-Hajar al-Aswad area in Damascus to the eastern desert of Suwayda. This coincided with the withdrawal of the government forces from the eastern part of Suwayda. On Aug. 25, 2018, ISIS launched a bloody attack on Suwayda, resulting in the death of dozens of residents. Furthermore, the government forces’ lack of support during the defense against the attack was evident, with only a few limited and timid airstrikes.
As a continuation of the actions of the government against the people of Jabal al-Druze to exert control over them, permission was granted to Ahmad al-Awda, commander of the Eighth Brigade of the Russian-backed Fifth Corps in Daraa, to launch an attack on al-Qrayya and the outskirts of Suwayda in 2020, where armed factions were formed and engaged in killings, abductions, and drug trade in Suwayda. The largest, strongest, and most terrifying of these factions was the al-Fajr forces led by Raji Falhout. However, the people of Suwayda managed to uproot his forces, dismantle his strongholds, and destroy his captagon labs, which were operated with the protection of Syrian intelligence and the Lebanese Hezbollah. All this was during the 2022 uprising that resulted in the escape of Falhout, and the elimination of his gang.
Indirect causes and the four lean years
The government has persistently waged an economic war against the residents in its areas of control since 2019. This has been done through excessive and exaggerated manipulation of the exchange rate, prioritizing the interests of traders over the welfare of the people. Furthermore, the authorities have allowed markets and prices to be controlled by influential traders, while implementing peculiar security and economic regulations. Consequently, prices have soared to unprecedented levels, while citizens’ income remains stagnant.
Additionally, Suwayda, like other governorates, has been subject to oppressive security measures and forced disappearance of its citizens. The government has employed a well-known tactic of state terrorism, as defined by the Ba’ath Party and the 1973/2012 Constitution. This involves the recruitment of agents from within the Ba’ath Party ranks to fabricate malicious reports against citizens. Additionally, three checkpoints have been set up along the road to Damascus, where people are arrested based on false charges. Moreover, the transportation and shipping sectors face additional burdensome levies. These checkpoints are named al-Masmiyah checkpoint (State Security), al-Adiliyah checkpoint (Military Security), and the Conferences Palace checkpoint (Air Intelligence).
Lastly, the government has turned Suwayda, that is located on the border with Jordan, into a center for drug manufacturing, including captagon, and a marketplace for its distribution. Moreover, it has become a smuggling route to Jordan and the Gulf states, implicating the people of Suwayda in this trade.
Immediate causes and the loss of hope
The restrictive measures imposed by state institutions on the young population in Suwayda, both economically and socially, as well as the hurdles faced by university students in Damascus, such as the high costs and difficulties in obtaining passports, have had a negative impact on them. This situation has caused concerns among parents and intellectuals regarding the future of their children and the governorate.
Consequently, the youth in Suwayda find themselves completely trapped, with only three options available to them. Firstly, they may get involved with drugs, either as smugglers, users, or members of drug gangs. Secondly, migration becomes a compelling choice for those who reject involvement in the drug trade, as they seek a better future by leaving the country.
The third option involves the risk of arrest and enforced disappearance. Those unable to leave Syria will face the government’s security forces, putting their future in jeopardy. Moreover, they will be closely monitored by Ba’ath Party agents, and the government’s checkpoints and prisons will be readily accessible for their detention.
The turning point
The long-standing grievances, the deteriorating economic situation, and the deep concerns of parents about their children’s future, combined with a bleak outlook for a better future, have created a prevailing sentiment of opposition towards the governing regime. This is evident in the significant involvement of women, particularly mothers, in the peaceful protest. They firmly believe that it is their right to provide a safe haven for their children and shield them away from drugs, migration, and arrests.
The loss of hope for improved circumstances has driven the younger generation, who experienced the 2011 revolution at a young age, to rise up against the government. However, all of this needed a spark to ignite the protests.
As usual, the government has managed to provide all the elements that fuel opposition against it. The announcement of a long-awaited salary increase, coupled with the removal of fuel subsidies, led to a significant surge in prices and raised concerns about the looming threat of famine. In response, calls for protests spread through social media platforms on Thursday, Aug. 17, 2023. Some citizens responded to these calls by gathering in al-Karama Square in Suwayda and Sultan Pasha al-Atrash Shrine in al-Qrayya, which became the initial focal points of the protests.
Within the protest, two main currents emerged. The first advocated for specific economic and social demands while avoiding direct confrontation with the existing government, while the second called for the complete “overthrow of the regime” as the ultimate solution to all issues. Ultimately, the second current gained more traction, gaining support from women, youth, and intellectuals.
The protesters at al-Karama Square agreed on a civil disobedience campaign that started on Sunday, Aug. 20, 2023, at 7:00 am. The protests in al-Karama Square halted on Fridays and Saturdays, but evening sit-ins continued in al-Qrayya, adopting slogans of “overthrowing the regime”.
On the morning of Sunday, Aug. 20, at exactly 7:00 am, the civil disobedience was announced. Government institutions and markets were closed, roads were blocked, and transportation came to a standstill in the governorate, causing significant disruption. Demonstrations took place in 36 locations in Suwayda, with the largest one occurring in al-Karama Square in the city center.
The protests continued in the following days, with the leader of the Druze al-Muwahhidun Sheikh al-Aql, Hikmat al-Hajiri, endorsing the demands of the protesters. Several factions committed to protecting peaceful demonstrations.
With each passing day, the protests gained momentum in terms of both participation and variety. The protesters achieved a significant impact by dismantling the influence of the Ba’ath Party in the governorate, closing down all its affiliated buildings, and removing images and statues of al-Assad and his late father, Hafez.
The protests continue to persist and escalate into the fourth week, leaving government intelligence and security agencies bewildered and powerless in the face of the peaceful and informed nature of the demonstrations. The wisdom of Sheikh al-Hajri and the support of the street have rendered these agencies incapable of countering the movement.
The protests remain ongoing and continue to intensify into the fourth week, leaving government intelligence and security agencies bewildered and ineffective. The peaceful and knowledgeable nature of the demonstrations, coupled with the wisdom of Sheikh al-Hijri and the support of the people, have rendered these agencies powerless.
The protesters are growing more determined and confident in their ability to achieve victory against al-Assad through peaceful and patriotic methods. They describe their movement as a “unifying revolution for all Syrians.”