By Emma Jamal
QAMISHLI, Syria (North Press) – The Wagner Group, a paramilitary organization funded by the Russian state, has emerged as a significant force in Russia’s military efforts over the past decade. Initially operating in the shadows, it gained prominence during the Arab Spring and the Euromaidan crisis in Ukraine. Led by Yevgeny Prigozhin, a prominent figure from Russia’s criminal underworld with ties to the Kremlin who died in a plane crash a week ago, the Wagner Group has transformed into a slickly marketed brand-name paramilitary.
It has generated a massive online following morphing into a Russian social movement that fuels the recruitment of contract fighters and attracts millions of dollars in donations and military gear. This report focuses on the presence and activities of the Wagner Group in Syria.
Origins and growth
The Wagner Group was first mentioned in 2015 after Russia negotiated the Minsk II agreement with Ukraine, with fragmented stories emerging about its titular commander Dmitry Utkin.
Over the years, the Wagner Group has grown into one of Russia’s most valuable armed assets, employing tens of thousands of fighters, including individuals drawn from Russian prisons.
The group faced challenges during the rebellion in Ukraine, but it survived and struck a deal with the Kremlin. Many mercenaries joined Yevgeny Prigozhin in exile in Belarus, while others were incorporated into the regular Russian military.
Presence in Syria
The Wagner Group is believed to have entered Syria in mid-2015, shortly after Russia officially intervened in the Syrian conflict to support Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.
Their initial deployment was likely in response to the escalating conflict and the need for additional military support for the Syrian government forces. The group participated in several significant battles and military operations alongside the Syrian government forces.
They were particularly involved in operations aimed at recapturing strategic areas and key oil and gas fields from the Syrian armed opposition factions and the Islamic State (ISIS).
One of the notable operations in which the Wagner Group participated was the Palmyra offensive in March 2016. Working in coordination with the government forces, they played a significant role in retaking the ancient city of Palmyra from ISIS militants.
The group’s presence and activities extended to various regions, including the vicinity of Homs, Palmyra, and Deir ez-Zor.
They were involved in battles against rebel groups and ISIS militants, supporting the Syrian government forces in recapturing territories and protecting key infrastructure.
As of the knowledge cutoff in Sep. 2021, the Wagner Group maintains a presence in government-held areas of Syria.
Their role includes providing ground forces, security, and support for the Syrian government in maintaining control over strategic areas, including oil and gas fields.
The group’s presence in Syria has become a crucial component of Russia’s military efforts in the region.
Prigozhin’s company, Evro Polis, reportedly struck a deal in 2016 with the Syrian government, granting a 25 percent share of oil and natural gas produced on a territory recaptured from ISIS.
The group mercenaries are contracted by the Syrian government to provide ground forces, assisting in the recapture and control of oil and gas fields on the eastern side of the Euphrates River.
Battle of Deir ez-Zor and hybrid warfare narrative
The pitched battle in Deir ez-Zor between the US forces and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) on the one hand and Russian Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs), including the Wagner Group, on the other hand, has become a focal point of competing narratives presented by Moscow and Washington.
The Kremlin officially denies any link to PMSC operations, but there is little public contradiction of the media narrative portraying Prigozhin as the puppet master behind the Wagner Group.
The battle’s ambiguity raises questions about the strategic value of allowing unchallenged narratives about the Wagner Group and Prigozhin, highlighting the potential objectives of obfuscation.
Moscow gains from the “ghost army fights hybrid warfare” narrative, as it provides a thin veneer of deniability while showcasing the integral role of private mercenary groups in Russia’s military efforts.
The Wagner Group’s presence in Syria demonstrates its significance as a Russian state-funded paramilitary organization. Operating under contract with the Syrian government, the group’s ground forces support the recapture and control of strategic territories, particularly oil and gas fields. While the Kremlin officially denies any involvement in private military operations, the Wagner Group’s activities and the narratives surrounding it raise intriguing questions about the objectives of confusion and the strategic gains for Moscow. Understanding the Wagner Group’s role in Syria contributes to a broader understanding of Russia’s military engagement in the region.