That elderly Kurdish woman sitting in the second row didn\u2019t seem to care about the dozens of journalists gathered in the conference hall of a hotel near Taksim Square in Istanbul. Nor did she pay much attention to the seven speakers seated on the stage, or the hundreds of others crowded into the unusually warm Thursday atmosphere on February 27, 2025. None of that mattered to her. She knew what she wanted. Her eyes were fixed on the giant screen behind the long row of speakers from the Equality and Democracy Party (DEM). She adjusted her posture, leaning left once, then right, as if sitting on hot coals.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The woman appeared to be in her seventies, wearing a sleeveless white woolen jacket and a white headscarf that covered her mouth. But when her enthusiasm overcame her restraint, she pushed it aside and let out a zaghrouda\u2014a trill<\/a>\u2014perhaps out of season, maybe to celebrate the speaker who had just greeted the audience in Kurdish. She clapped before anyone else and stopped after everyone else, urging the speakers to press forward, to skip the interruptions and introductions, and reach the climactic moment she awaited with barely contained impatience.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This conservative Kurdish woman, dressed in her rural attire, likely didn\u2019t understand politics. She probably didn\u2019t grasp concepts like \u201cstrategy,\u201d \u201crealistic socialism,\u201d \u201ccapitalism,\u201d \u201cextreme nationalism,\u201d \u201cfederalism,\u201d \u201cself-governance,\u201d or the \u201ccultural solutions\u201d that the leader Abdullah \u00d6calan spoke<\/a> of in a letter read aloud in Turkish and Kurdish<\/a>. Yet, she stood up and trilled\u2014louder this time\u2014when \u00d6calan\u2019s image appeared on the giant screen.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Deep down, her instinct told her these were mere concepts, minor details compared to the reality of the leader who sat there in the center of the image, in flesh and blood, carrying a message he had written by hand. He looked straight into the camera lens without hesitation or ambiguity, after 26 years as a prisoner on the isolated \u0130mral\u0131 Island, preceded by 20 years as a refugee in Syria fleeing arrest, and before that, 10 years earlier, when the idea of \u201cKurdistan\u201d first took shape in his mind in 1969. This man had spent 56 of his 76 years chasing a dream he was now entirely abandoning, without conditions<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n She clapped for a long time, as did many others in the press conference hall. Some were utterly stunned by the content of \u00d6calan\u2019s letter, which they had just heard, but the woman waited,, until the final moments of the conference to express her gratitude to the DEM party representatives. She patted their shoulders, acknowledging their management of this complex process, originally launched by Devlet Bah\u00e7eli, leader of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), last October. Bah\u00e7eli now lay in a hospital, hovering between life and death.<\/p>\n\n\n\n For her, there was no distinction between \u201cthe cause\u201d and \u201cthe leader\u201d\u2014they were one and the same. But other supporters struggled to comprehend what had happened: Had \u00d6calan truly abandoned \u201cthe Kurds and Kurdistan\u201d? What had he agreed to in this reconciliation process? Had everything been for naught? More than 50,000 dead<\/a>, roughly $450 billion in expenses<\/a>, and about 14% losses<\/a> in Turkey\u2019s GDP\u2014some couldn\u2019t reconcile the enormity of the losses with the ambiguity of the gains. They turned to conspiracy theories: the leader\u2019s message was coded, decipherable only by the elite decision-makers. Others argued he \u201cmeant the opposite of what he said\u201d\u2014that \u201claying down arms\u201d meant clinging to them, and \u201cstopping the fight\u201d meant pressing forward.<\/p>\n\n\n\n But \u00d6calan\u2019s message contained no codes and didn\u2019t imply the opposite of what it stated. It simply called for peace based on \u201cKurdish-Turkish brotherhood<\/a>,\u201d harking back to when the Marwanid Kurds decisively fought<\/a> alongside the Seljuk Turkish commander Alp Arslan to defeat the Byzantines and open the gates of Anatolia at the Battle of Manzikert in 1071. One outcome of that alliance was Ahmad Sanjar (1086\u20131118), Alp Arslan\u2019s grandson, declaring the establishment of a \u201cKurdistan\u201d province<\/a>. Yet, in his letter, \u00d6calan rejected the idea of a Kurdish nation-state, a federal Kurdistan region, self-governance, or \u201ccultural solutions.\u201d He argued that the world had moved beyond such proposals and that the solution lay in building \u201cdemocratic societies,\u201d with Kurds and Turks struggling together to achieve it. In this context, it\u2019s worth noting the map by the Turkish scholar Mahmud al-Kashgari<\/a> from 1072, which marks \u201cthe land of the Kurds<\/a>\u201d in the same geographic location where Kurds live today.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The woman likely didn\u2019t care to understand what \u201cdemocratic societies\u201d meant. For her, \u201cKurdistan\u201d was as clear as the sun in the sky: present in her stance, her applause, her attire, her trills, her fervor; present in her decision to endure the hardship of attending a press conference; present in the coals she sat upon, in her wide smile as she finally saw the leader on the screen after a long wait; present in her pats on the shoulders\u2014reassuring, affirming, certain that she was \u201cKurdish,\u201d and that \u201cKurdistan\u201d lived in her heart before it was a entity with geographic borders.<\/p>\n\n\n\n But other Kurds wept that day. The event was too much for them to bear. The grand idea of \u201cKurdistan\u201d they thought they\u2019d imbibed with their mothers\u2019 milk seemed farther from realization than ever\u2014since the poet Ahmad Khani called for it in his famous poem<\/a> four centuries ago, and after over a hundred years of their identity being erased, labeled \u201cmountain Turks\u201d under the Turkish nationalist narrative, or \u201cBouyjiya\u201d [offending phrase in the Syrian accent meaning \u201cshoe polishers\u201d<\/em>] under the Syrian Arab nationalist one. Both narratives failed, and the Kurds endured, growing stronger<\/a> through their civil political movement.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Kurds weren\u2019t the only ones who cried. Four months earlier, Turks had wept too, when the hardline nationalist Devlet Bah\u00e7eli, in a long speech<\/a> from the Grand National Assembly of Turkey on October 22, 2024, called on Abdullah \u00d6calan to dissolve the Kurdistan Workers\u2019 Party (PKK) and lay down arms in exchange for a conditional pardon, advocating for a broad peace and reconciliation process in the country. Nationalists wept<\/a> then too, for his speech was historic, crossing red lines they were accustomed to. It might bridge the divide between Turkish and Kurdish societies and lead to a sweeping shift in Turkey\u2019s electoral blocs.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Months before Assad\u2019s fall, it was evident that President Recep Tayyip Erdo\u011fan and his ally Bah\u00e7eli were increasingly wary of the fallout from Israel\u2019s wars in Gaza and Lebanon, and the chaos they could unleash in the Middle East. This was especially true as Kurds began preparing to capitalize on the vacuum left by Iran\u2019s waning influence in Syria and Hezbollah\u2019s collapse under successive Israeli strikes. In his parliamentary speech, Bah\u00e7eli\u2014for the first time\u2014praised the diversity of the Ottoman Empire, despite Turkish nationalists historically refusing to acknowledge it. Among nationalists, it was whispered that<\/a> Bah\u00e7eli took this step in response to shifting power dynamics due to the Israeli war, to preempt any scenario where Turkey might lose influence in Syria\u2014or, in a worst-case scenario, lose Turkish territory.<\/p>\n\n\n\n But the matter seems more complex. When Bah\u00e7eli made his call in October, he didn\u2019t anticipate Assad\u2019s fall at the precise moment it occurred. Yet, necessity drove him to propose the peace process in Turkey to avert a potential \u201cstrategic disaster\u201d in Syria. Bah\u00e7eli, and Erdo\u011fan behind him, saw that Turkey needed to convince the increasingly bold Kurds\u2014especially in Syria\u2014that their best option was an alliance with the Turks.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Since that day, we\u2019ve continued to debate the implications of Bah\u00e7eli\u2019s speech and track the subsequent steps, shrouded in much ambiguity due to the Turkish authorities\u2019 lack of transparency. Key questions persist even after \u00d6calan\u2019s letter: Has the peace process truly begun? Have the next steps been negotiated? What are those steps? If the peace process has started, why does it seem like Bah\u00e7eli is its sole architect and driver, despite being on his deathbed? Why does Erdo\u011fan, when addressing the process, keep his remarks brief, using vague, neutral phrases? Why doesn\u2019t he show any public commitment to it? Why does Turkey speak of a breakthrough with \u201cthe Kurds\u201d while simultaneously pressuring them\u2014isolating Kurdish politicians from local administrations and militarily pressuring the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)? Most importantly: Is this truly the start of a historic resolution?<\/p>\n\n\n\n Thus, while analyses link the peace process to developments in Syria, the sequence of steps initiating this opening doesn\u2019t fully align with that narrative. Insisting on this connection might obscure the more pragmatic and vital motives driving Erdo\u011fan<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Erdo\u011fan\u2019s goals or expectations from this process can be summarized<\/a> in three points:<\/p>\n\n\n\n First Goal:<\/strong> Erdo\u011fan needs a decision for early elections to enable him to run for president again. Having been elected three times, he\u2019s constitutionally barred from a fourth term in 2028 unless through a constitutional amendment or early elections. Early elections seem the easier first step, but the current parliamentary balance doesn\u2019t allow his Justice and Development Party (AKP) to pass such a decision. If DEM party deputies cooperate, Erdo\u011fan\u2019s dilemma could be resolved. This goal appears agreed upon unless the peace process collapses.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Second Goal:<\/strong> Erdo\u011fan fears the Republican People\u2019s Party (CHP) candidate who will challenge him in the presidential race. Potential candidates include Ekrem \u0130mamo\u011flu (CHP), Istanbul\u2019s mayor; Mansur Yava\u015f (CHP with nationalist leanings), Ankara\u2019s mayor; \u00d6zg\u00fcr \u00d6zel, CHP leader; and \u00dcmit \u00d6zda\u011f, leader of the far-right Victory Party, recently arrested for inciting hatred. Erdo\u011fan seeks to fragment the opposition as much as possible, pushing it into internal conflict. He hopes to imprison \u0130mamo\u011flu, paving the way for the remaining three to compete and split votes. If Bah\u00e7eli dies, Erdo\u011fan might convince Yava\u015f to join the nationalists and lead the MHP. He\u2019d also push the DEM to field a strong Kurdish candidate, at least in the initial nomination phase, to ethnically divide voter support. If he advances the peace process, many Kurdish votes could ultimately go to him.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Third Goal:<\/strong> Erdo\u011fan aims to pressure the DEM to support a constitutional amendment allowing a president to be elected indefinitely without the 50% threshold. Though unlikely, if the DEM agrees, Turkey could resemble Russia\u2019s governance model, and the Kurds would bear that stigma for years.<\/p>\n\n\n\n If so, why does Erdo\u011fan seem hesitant about the process? It\u2019s clear he meticulously planned this, drawing on lessons from the 2013\u20132015 peace process. The first lesson: success with the Kurds is impossible if faced with cohesive Turkish nationalist opposition. Though nationalist parties hold 20% of the vote, their rhetoric can mobilize beyond their electoral weight. Erdo\u011fan learned he must dismantle the nationalist front to succeed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The second lesson: the government\u2019s negotiation approach. From 2013\u20132015, he realized overt government involvement backfires and risks failure. Notably, the MHP, a key reason for the earlier process\u2019s collapse, is now a major supporter of the new one\u2014though it\u2019s unclear how Erdo\u011fan convinced Bah\u00e7eli to kick it off.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Erdo\u011fan takes extraordinary care to neither appear engaged in nor opposed to the process. In this new peace effort, he employs a precise tactic: seeming unready for reconciliation while continuing negotiations\u2014using a \u201ccarrot-and-stick\u201d approach with the DEM, giving him the upper hand. This will ultimately divide the Kurds: some will accept talks, others reject them. This benefits Erdo\u011fan, allowing him to tell his nationalist base: \u201cLook at the Kurds refusing to negotiate.\u201d His \u201ctough softness\u201d strategy<\/a>, alternating roles with Bah\u00e7eli, confuses both opposition and supporters, who grapple with the government\u2019s contradictory behavior\u2014negotiating yet repressing. This also disorients the CHP, unable to take a clear stance: supporting the process risks accusations of collaborating with the PKK and dividing the state; caution risks charges of obstructing peace. Backing it loses hardline nationalist and moderate right-wing votes; opposing it loses some Kurdish votes. The more the CHP flounders, the stronger the perception it\u2019s unfit to govern.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Erdo\u011fan wins either way. If the PKK disbands smoothly, he\u2019ll claim credit for ending a 40-year insurgency, facing a weakened opposition in the next election. If it falters, he\u2019ll appear strong by cracking down on the opposition and targeting Kurdish forces in Syria.<\/p>\n\n\n\n He\u2019s deliberately avoided a direct role, leaving the stage to Bah\u00e7eli, separating his political future from the talks\u2019 outcome. If this holds, the \u201cKurdish opening\u201d isn\u2019t just a political maneuver but a broader state-led initiative.<\/a> AKP deputy chairman Efkan Ala indirectly hinted at this, saying<\/a>, \u201cThe essence of [\u00d6calan\u2019s] call is for the organization to lay down arms and dissolve, but we\u2019re also looking at what comes next.\u201d It\u2019s not just about disarmament but whether it\u2019s achievable\u2014a broader effort is needed for success.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Founded in November 1978, the PKK began shifting operations outside Turkey in early 1979, moving to Syria to exploit regional conditions, establishing a base beyond Turkish pressure. Born in Turkey, it grew and matured in Syria. Erdo\u011fan and Bah\u00e7eli know this.<\/p>\n\n\n\n When the Assad regime withdrew from northeast Syria early in the civil war, locals of various backgrounds, led by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and Syrian Democratic Council (SDC), established a quasi-state with military, administrative, and judicial structures. For the first time, the SDF and SDC governed autonomously, consolidating control and legitimacy through self-administration institutions. Fighting ISIS cemented their role as a major regional actor, securing international military\u2014and often political\u2014support. The SDF quickly grasped the strategic advantages of state-building, diplomacy, and alliances. After 30 years of armed struggle and thousands of deaths, the PKK, a legitimate offspring of this region, sees northeast Syria\u2019s future as worth dissolving itself for, fully paving the way for the SDF as a Syrian-oriented entity\u2014a strategically sound move.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Kurdish issue has always had a geopolitical dimension. The more states controlling Kurdistan suppressed the Kurds, the more they adapted. Their national cause evolved from political and cultural representation to regional security. No longer confined to identity and minority rights, it\u2019s now a regional matter<\/a> shaping\u2014and shaped by\u2014the Middle East\u2019s broader power dynamics.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Yet, northeast Syria\u2019s future remains unclear. The SDF still faces daily attacks from the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army. Ankara won\u2019t ease this pressure unless the \u201cpeace process\u201d with the PKK succeeds. Only then might Turkey soften its stance toward the SDF, reassessing fears that Syrian Kurdish governance threatens its national security. For Turkey to shift, the SDF and SDC must clearly separate from the PKK, with the latter dissolving and offering guarantees that current borders won\u2019t change. Including or excluding Kurds in Syria\u2019s governance is pivotal to regional power balances, especially affecting Turkey\u2019s dynamics with the U.S., Israel, and Arab states wary of Ankara\u2019s expanding influence. Without Kurdish political integration, Syria won\u2019t see long-term stability.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Erdo\u011fan knows the \u201cKurdish issue\u201d<\/a> in Turkey is no longer about cultural rights or representation but strategic positioning and regional security. Turkish researcher Arzu Y\u0131lmaz<\/a> notes the current peace process isn\u2019t \u201ca traditional initiative<\/a> to address historical grievances; it\u2019s about building alliances, where regional alignments and power balances dictate engagement.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n In this context, \u00d6calan\u2019s message makes sense. His vision seeks to lift the \u201cKurdish issue\u201d from its narrow national frame into one of building a \u201cdemocratic society.\u201d This was clear in a letter, addressed by Selahattin Demirta\u015f<\/a> to Kurds and Turks alike:<\/p>\n\n\n\n Don\u2019t fear peace or reconciliation, my brother. Don\u2019t fear Turks and Kurds uniting to make Turkey stronger. Don\u2019t fear supporting any step that brings peace to the region. Don\u2019t fear, so we can silence the guns this time and let politics speak. Through political struggle, let\u2019s overcome poverty, unemployment, hunger, injustice, and inequality together. Let\u2019s redirect the billions spent on war to the people directly. And let\u2019s not forget: peace also means bread, work, and livelihood.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n Erdo\u011fan isn\u2019t a democrat unless it curbs his opponents, nor a nationalist unless it wins votes. Islamists believe in neither democracy nor nationalism. Yet, if the PKK disarms, he\u2019d have to release thousands of Kurdish politicians from prison and allow their political participation\u2014provided it doesn\u2019t aid his rivals or contradict his agenda. Demirta\u015f knows this, urging patience and persistence in his letter\u2019s tone. Peace and a democratic society don\u2019t come all at once, and he recognizes the long, arduous path to convincing Turks that Kurds are an asset, not a threat. He aims to shift the peace process<\/a> from violence-centric to politics- and law-centric.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Syrian Kurds will also face this grueling journey, persuading others they\u2019re an asset, not a threat\u2014that a peaceful, prosperous region, state, or entity can be built, where diverse identities enrich rather than impoverish. Whether Bah\u00e7eli and \u00d6calan\u2019s \u201cpeace process\u201d succeeds or fails, one thing is certain: the \u201cKurdish issue\u201d is no longer just national aspirations but a decisive factor in building a reconciled, prosperous society.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The rural Kurdish woman at the press conference knew instinctively\u2014shaped by centuries of struggle\u2014that the message\u2019s content wasn\u2019t the point. The meaning lay in the bigger, grander picture.<\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" That elderly Kurdish woman sitting in the second row didn\u2019t seem to care about the dozens of journalists gathered in the conference hall of a hotel near Taksim Square in Istanbul. Nor did she pay much attention to the seven speakers seated on the stage, or the hundreds of others crowded into the unusually warm […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":11,"featured_media":122884,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"pgc_sgb_lightbox_settings":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[39,11,262],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-122882","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-home","category-opinions","category-rashad-abdulqader"],"yoast_head":"\n<\/a>But why had Bah\u00e7eli launched this initiative?<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n
<\/a>The Initiative Shrouded in Ambiguity<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n
<\/a>Why Would the PKK Lay Down Arms?<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n
<\/a>Editing and Translation by Hisham Arafat<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n